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ARTICLES
THE COMMODIFICATION OF PUBLIC LAND
RECORDS
Reid Kress Weisbord* & Stewart E. Sterk**
The United States deed recording system alters the “first in time, first in right”
doctrine to enable good faith purchasers to record their deeds to protect themselves
against prior unrecorded conveyances and to provide constructive notice of their
interests to potential subsequent purchasers. Constructive notice, however, works only
when land records are available for public inspection, a practice that had long proved
uncontroversial. For centuries, deed archives were almost exclusively patronized by
land-transacting parties because the difficulty and cost of title examination deterred
nearly everyone else.
The modern information economy, however, propelled this staid corner of property
law into a computer age in which land records are electronically maintained and
instantaneously accessible over the internet. That development transformed public
land records into a marketable commodity independent of the deed recording system’s
notice-giving function. In response to booming demand for big data, content extracted
from public land records (name, home address, marital status, among other personal
information) is now actively traded on the internet and routinely purchased by
commercial firms for targeted marketing and customer prospecting. Data from public
land records are now more accessible than ever before, representing a win for
transparency, but, as tragically illustrated by the recent high-profile attack against a
federal judge, an erosion of privacy that can dangerously equip wrongdoers with ondemand entrée to personal information.
This Article provides the first scholarly account of the deed recording system’s
transformation from a notice-giving mechanism of property law to a primary supplier
of commodified data for sale in the modern information economy. The Article surveys
the traditional functions of deed recording, describes the recent migration of deeds from
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paper to electronic form as the predicate for commodification, and considers the
implications of electronic disclosure for privacy, transparency, and the regulation of
anonymous entity ownership. The Article concludes by appraising the efficacy of recent
privacy reforms under consideration by Congress and state legislatures, and by
outlining voluntary precautions that homeowners can implement under existing law.
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INTRODUCTION
On Sunday, July 19, 2020, at approximately 5:00 p.m., a seventytwo-year-old attorney named Roy Den Hollander disguised himself as
a Federal Express deliveryman and rang the doorbell of the New Jersey
residence of United States District Court Judge Esther Salas. 1 Daniel

1 See Neil Vigdor, Aimee Ortiz & Kevin Armstrong, Husband and Son of a Federal Judge
Are Shot in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/19
/nyregion/shooting-nj-judge-esther-salas.html [https://perma.cc/KS97-F3PW]; Nicole
Hong, William K. Rashbaum, Mihir Zaveri & Katherine Rosman, Suspect in Death of N.J.
Judge’s Son Is Linked to California Killing, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2020) [hereinafter Hong et al.,
Suspect],
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22/nyregion/roy-den-hollander-esthersalas.html [https://perma.cc/S2LT-5TMD]; Nicole Hong, Mihir Zaveri & William K.
Rashbaum, Inside the Violent and Misogynistic World of Roy Den Hollander, N.Y. TIMES (July 26,
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Anderl, Judge Salas’s twenty-year-old son and only child, answered the
door, whereupon Hollander pulled out a semiautomatic pistol and
opened fire at pointblank range; Daniel’s wounds were fatal. 2 When
Mark Anderl, Judge Salas’s husband, ran outside to see what had
caused the commotion, Hollander shot Mark multiple times before
fleeing the scene. 3 Judge Salas was in the basement during the
shooting and was not physically harmed. 4 Mark survived the attack,
but remained hospitalized weeks after the shooting. 5 The next day,
Hollander’s body was found in the Catskills, where authorities believe
he committed suicide. 6
Hollander’s ghastly targeting of Judge Salas’s family was not a
random act of violence. In 2015, Hollander appeared before Judge
Salas as a litigant in a civil action challenging the male-only military
draft on grounds of sex discrimination. 7 In 2018, Judge Salas ruled in
Hollander’s favor, allowing his civil action to proceed beyond the
pleadings, “but [Hollander] still ranted about her in his online
writings, insulting her and claiming that she was a beneficiary of
affirmative action.” 8 Despite her reputation as a well-respected and
hard-working jurist, Hollander published baseless insults about Judge
Salas, describing her as “a lazy and incompetent Latina judge
appointed by Obama.” 9
Investigators quickly connected Hollander to another shooting in
California that bore a chilling similarity to the tragedy in New Jersey. 10
On July 11, 2020, an armed assailant disguised as a Federal Express
deliveryman shot and killed fifty-two-year-old attorney Marc Angelucci
outside his home in San Bernardino, California. 11 Apparently,
Angelucci and Hollander were bitter rivals in the fringe movement
advocating for the protection of “men’s rights.” 12 Authorities believe
that Hollander may have been planning the assassination of other
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/26/nyregion/roy-den-hollander-judge.html
[https://perma.cc/A5PA-YAFH].
2 See sources cited supra note 1; Amanda Rosa, The Son of a N.J. Judge Was Killed. Here’s
What We Know., N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22
/nyregion/esther-salas-son-roy-den-hollander.html [https://perma.cc/DC7E-2C6W].
3 See id.
4 See id.
5 See Tracey Tully, Judge Whose Son Was Killed by Misogynistic Lawyer Speaks Out, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/nyregion/esther-salas-royden-hollander.html [https://perma.cc/VA8W-XWVW].
6 See Hong et al., Suspect, supra note 1.
7 See id.
8 See id.
9 See Rosa, supra note 2.
10 See Hong et al., Suspect, supra note 1; Rosa, supra note 2.
11 See Hong et al., Suspect, supra note 1.
12 See id.
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judges to avenge long-simmering grievances, a concern that had
previously prompted the FBI to alert New York Chief Judge Janet M.
DiFiore that Hollander possessed a document with her name and
photograph in his car. 13
In a heartrending video, Judge Salas explained how she believed
Hollander obtained her family’s home address:
[W]hat we cannot accept is when we are forced to live in fear for
our lives because personal information like our home addresses can
easily be obtained by anyone seeking to do us or our families harm.
Unfortunately for my family, the threat was real. And the free flow
of information from the internet allowed this sick and depraved
human being to find all our personal information and target us.
Currently federal judges’ addresses and other information is readily
available on the internet. In addition, there are companies that will
sell your personal details that can be leveraged for nefarious
purposes. In my case, the monster knew where I lived and what
church we attended and had a complete dossier on me and my
family. At the moment, there is nothing we can do to stop it. And
that is unacceptable. My son’s death cannot be in vain. 14

*

*

*

The real property deed recording system, once a staid and
uncontroversial corner of property law, is in the midst of a seismic
transformation as public land records enter the internet age. Title
documents recorded with a local register of deeds were always
considered matters of public record, but when maintained offline in a
municipal filing room, they were not available to members of the
public without an in-person visit to city hall. Today, however, most
public land records have been digitized and, in many cases, real
property deeds and the personal identity data that they display are
accessible via the internet. The internet, in turn, has made the
ownership of real property more transparent, but, for homeowners,
the widespread online dissemination of property deeds—and the
ability of data brokers to extract personal information from those
documents—represents a significant erosion of privacy.
The horrific attack against Judge Salas and her family offers a
compelling justification for enhancing personal safety protections for
individuals, including judges and other public officials, who interact
with risky or dangerous segments of the population. 15 But the online
13 See id.
14 Mercury, Statement from U.S. District Judge Esther Salas, YOUTUBE (Aug. 3, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sLWJPlAIPvE.
15 See U.S. MARSHALS SERV., DEP’T OF JUST., UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE
FY2020 ANNUAL REPORT 40 (2021) (noting 4449 “[i]nappropriate [c]ommunications
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dissemination of data from public land records also implicates broader
questions about the privacy interests and personal safety of millions of
ordinary American homeowners: How, if at all, should the electronic
publication of personal identity information extracted from public
land records be regulated as a general matter? Judge Salas directed
her criticism of the system at websites that publish and sell personal
details, including home address information. The source of the
information that led to her son’s killing remains unclear, as many
routine transactions have the potential to expose personal data to
public view. But much personal information comes from digitized real
property records supplied by the government itself through local deed
recording registries. In fact, after centuries of maintaining a low
profile as quiet custodians, local deed recorders are now at the
vanguard of a newly booming industry that pays handsomely for
electronic access to what has become known as “personally identifiable
information” (PII) collected from publicly filed property deeds. 16
There are many definitions of PII, but the term is generally
understood to encompass “information that can be used to distinguish
or trace an individual’s identity, either alone or when combined with
other personal or identifying information that is linked or linkable to
a specific individual.” 17 PII includes, for example, an individual’s first
and last name, home address information, telephone numbers, email
addresses, information identifying personally owned property, age and
date of birth, marital status, and family information. 18 Publicly filed
land records may contain several categories of PII, such as home

/[t]hreats to [p]rotected [p]erson[s]” in fiscal 2019 and 4261 in fiscal 2020); Emily Roscoe
& Charles Szypszak, Privacy and Public Real Estate Records: Preserving Legacy System Reliability
Against Modern Threats, 49 URB. LAW. 355, 356–61 (2017) (describing the rising trend of
retaliatory fraudulent liens filed against law enforcement officers and public employees);
Jonathan Grant, Note, Address Confidentiality and Real Property Records: Safeguarding Interests
in Land While Protecting Battered Women, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2577 (2016) (describing the
privacy needs of domestic violence survivors with respect to residential address
information); Jodi Wilgoren, Electrician Says in Suicide Note That He Killed Judge’s Family, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/11/us/electrician-says-insuicide-note-that-he-killed-judges-family.html [https://perma.cc/B6XP-VVB6] (reporting
on the murder of a federal judge’s spouse and parent by a disgruntled litigant).
16 The phrase “personally identifiable information” is a misnomer because what is
identifiable is the person, not the information, but the term, and the abbreviation PII, have
become ubiquitous. See, e.g., Rules and Policies—Protecting PII—Privacy Act, U.S. GEN. SERVS.
ADMIN. (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.gsa.gov/reference/gsa-privacy-program/rules-andpolicies-protecting-pii-privacy-act [https://perma.cc/RZ4D-TYFD].
17 2 C.F.R. § 200.79 (defining Personally Identifiable Information (PII)).
18 See, e.g., Examples of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), U.S. ARMY REC.’S MGMT.
& DECLASSIFICATION AGENCY, https://www.rmda.army.mil/privacy/PII/PII-examples.html
[https://perma.cc/ED4F-RDQ9].
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address and marital status. 19 That PII, as it turns out, is incredibly
valuable because it can be used for targeted marketing and customer
prospecting activities in what has grown into a $49 billion market for
big data. 20
The supply of PII collected from public records has increased
rapidly to meet the demand. Local deed recorders, themselves, are
now in the business of selling access to digitized public land records to
commercial data brokers who, in turn, deploy artificial intelligence
and search bots to collect and disseminate homeowners’ PII. Title
insurance companies, who amassed their own store of PII from public
land records to improve the efficiency of title examination, also
became active data marketers upon discovering that their existing
warehouse of information could be repackaged and sold as big data.
Critically, however, this free flow of information is a one-way street—
once an individual’s name and home address are published online, the
resulting electronic record is nearly impossible for a homeowner to
remove from the internet.
Mostly unnoticed by the general public, and largely overlooked by
property law scholars, the digitization of real property records, and the
resulting commercialization of PII, represents the most significant
development in generations for the American deed recording system.
Originally conceived as a notice-based protection for land purchasers
and lienholders, the deed recording system is now publicly accessible
online and is used routinely for purposes not directly related to the
sale or encumbrance of real property, such as commercial data mining,
targeted marketing, and customer prospecting. We characterize this
transformation as the commodification of public land records because,
in the modern information economy, electronically accessible deeds
have become valuable assets that are readily exchangeable and
exploitable on the open market for big data. The commodification of
public land records has, in turn, begun to alter the privacy preferences
for some homeowners. Indeed, the hyper-transparency of property
records coincided with a notable shift in the high-end real estate
market where purchasers increasingly transact in the names of shell

19 For example, a tenancy by the entirety is a concurrent form of ownership created
when “[a] husband and wife together take title to an interest in real property or personal
property under a written instrument designating both of their names as husband and wife.”
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-17.2(a) (West 2021). Because the designation of both owners as
husband and wife (or, in the case of a same-sex couple, as married spouses) is in the titling
of the property, it will appear on the publicly recorded deed.
20 Mark Albertson, Software, Not Hardware, Will Catapult Big Data into a $103B Business
by 2027, SILICONANGLE (Mar. 9, 2018), https://siliconangle.com/2018/03/09/big-datamarket-hit-103b-2027-services-key-say-analysts-bigdatasv/ [https://perma.cc/UR6Y-EDVG]
(2019 forecast).
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companies rather than in their own names as individuals. Some buyers
use anonymous entity ownership for privacy from the prying eyes of
the press and commercial data brokers, while others use shell
companies for less legitimate reasons, such as money laundering and
creditor avoidance.
We contend that the commodification of public land records,
coupled with the rise of anonymous entity ownership, raises
challenging new questions about the traditional functions of the deed
recording system. Individuals who record title to real property in their
own name must tolerate the irrevocable online disclosure of their PII.
In contrast, homeowners who conceal their identity through
anonymous entity ownership find themselves ensnared in the
government’s efforts to regulate financial crimes. Policymakers and
scholars have yet to grapple rigorously with the many legal implications
of commodifying public land records, including the social
consequences of eroding the privacy of real estate ownership, the
public interest in promoting real estate ownership transparency, the
ability of law enforcement agencies to regulate financial crimes
involving anonymously owned real estate, and the deed recording
system’s capacity to protect the interests of land purchasers and
lienholders amid growing preferences for entity ownership. As we will
explain, recent efforts by lawmakers in Congress and state legislatures
to restrict the disclosure and online publication of PII belonging to
judges and government officials reflect a commendable concern about
the dangers of public access to personal data of public officials, but
those reforms will be difficult to implement successfully and they do
nothing to protect the privacy of ordinary homeowners seeking privacy
of information concerning their personal residence.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I explains the traditional
function of public deed recording as a notification system designed to
protect land purchasers and lienholders. Part II explores recent
developments in the custodianship of real property records, including
the privatization, digitization, and commercialization of information
extracted from public land records. Part III examines the competing
policy concerns surrounding the commodification of land records,
including the role of privacy law in protecting personal information
extracted from public land records, precautions that individuals can
take to protect their information from disclosure online, and
government efforts that restrict ownership privacy in its effort to
combat money laundering.
I.

TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF DEED RECORDING

This Part describes the traditional functions of public deed
recording, which served as a notification system to protect land
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purchasers and lienholders. We examine the history and mechanics
of recording statutes, the property interests protected by the system of
deed recording, the practice of recording title in the name of trustees,
corporations, and anonymous legal entities, and the uniquely local
nature of deed recording.
A. History and Mechanics of Recording Statutes
Real estate transactions in the United States have been a matter of
public record since colonial times. England had no recording system
when colonists arrived in Massachusetts, but, in 1640, the
Massachusetts General Court enacted an ordinance designed to
promote the security of land title. 21 The ordinance provided that, so
“that every man may know what estate or interest other men may have
in any houses, lands, or other hereditaments,” no deed would be valid
against anyone except the grantor and his heirs “unlesse the same bee
recorded.”22 Under this ordinance, the government established a
public forum for deed recording without assuming legal responsibility
for regulating the quality of title. Grantees had a powerful incentive
to record deeds publicly which, in turn, served the law’s primary
purpose: deterring title fraud by landowners attempting to sell the
same property more than once. 23 The Massachusetts statute, and its
focus on public recording as the source of superior title, served as the
foundation for real property recording acts prevailing in all American
states from coast to coast. 24 By 1893, the California Supreme Court
considered the matter settled law: “[P]rovisions of recording acts are
for the protection of subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers from
the common grantor, and do not affect the rights of strangers to the
21 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW
ENGLAND, 1628–1641, at 306 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White 1853), cited
in Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The Origin of the System of Recording Deeds in America, 19 GREEN BAG
335, 337 (1907).
22 Id.
23 See Jackson v. Post, 15 Wend. 588, 594 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (“The object of the
recording acts is to prevent frauds—to prevent the person having title to land from selling
it more than once, and thereby defrauding one or more of the purchasers.”); see, e.g.,
Montgomery Cnty. v. MERSCORP Inc., 795 F.3d 372, 376 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The primary
purpose of Pennsylvania’s land recording statutes is ‘to give public notice in whom the title
resides; so that no one may be defrauded by deceptious appearance of title.’”) (quoting
Salter v. Reed, 15 Pa. 260, 263 (Pa. 1850))); Claflin v. Comm. State Bank, 487 N.W.2d 242,
248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (“The purpose of the [Minnesota] recording act is to protect
those who purchase real estate in reliance upon the record.”).
24 Beale, supra note 21, at 337; see also 1 JOYCE PALOMAR, PATTON AND PALOMAR ON
LAND TITLES § 4, at 10 (3d ed. 2003) (“The effect to be given to the record in determining
the priority of conflicting conveyances appears to have originated in the statutes of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony.”)

WEISBORD_STERK_03_23.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

3/23/2022 3:48 PM

THE COMMODIFICATION OF PUBLIC LAND RECORDS

515

claim of title.”25 Thus, the act of recording an instrument affecting
title to real property is, itself, “from the time of recording, notice to all
subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and judgment creditors of the
execution of the document recorded and its contents.” 26
Public access to deeds, however, is not essential to a system of
private property. Prior possession, rather than prior recording, served
as the foundation of title in common law England. 27 Deeds were
merely evidence of the transfer of the right to possession 28—evidence
that a property transferor would present to a transferee, but not to the
public at large. The transfer itself typically required livery of seisin, a
ritual during which the transferor delivered a physical manifestation
of the transferred land—a twig, or a clod of dirt—to the transferee. 29
Rooting title in possession, however, presented significant risks to a
purchaser, who lacked the ability to authenticate the current
possessor’s title without a complete record of all prior possessors. 30 A
public recording system reduced those risks by ensuring that a good
faith purchaser would prevail over the holder of a prior unrecorded
deed. 31 Public access to deeds is also unnecessary in a system where
government maintains an official, legally binding, registry of title to
real property. For instance, the English Land Registration Act of
1925 32 provided for registration of title, but restricted public access to
title records within the registry. 33 In general, one could obtain
registration information only by permission of the registrant. 34 As a
safeguard against fraud, however, a purchaser had the right to inspect
a title record to confirm representations made by the registrant. 35
By contrast, public access to deeds is essential under the peculiar
American system in which no government entity maintains definitive
25 Garber v. Gianella, 33 P. 458, 459 (Cal. 1893).
26 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:26A-12(a) (West 2021).
27 Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 137 (1918).
28 Id.
29 See 1 PALOMAR, supra note 24, § 3.
30 See Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of
Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 303–04 (1984) (comparing filing systems with possessionbased property systems and concluding that filing systems reduce the uncertainty
concerning transfer by permitting parties to discover the true owner more easily).
31 Id.
32 For more complete discussion of the Act, see C. Dent Bostick, Land Title
Registration: An English Solution to an American Problem, 63 IND. L.J. 55, 90–101 (1988).
33 See Land Registration Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 21, § 112 (UK) (“[A]ny person
registered as proprietor of any land or charge, and any person authorised by any such
proprietor, or by an order of the court, or by general rule, but no other person, may inspect
and make copies of and extracts from any register or document in the custody of the
registrar relating to such land or charge.”).
34 Id.
35 See id. § 110(1).
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information about the state of title. 36 Under the American system, a
prospective land purchaser must satisfy herself that the seller acquired
acceptable title and did not convey any of that title to someone else.
The purchaser therefore wants to see all relevant deeds to and from
the seller. But the purchaser cannot ask the deed recording official to
produce this information because deeds are not organized by land
parcel. Instead, deeds are filed and maintained chronologically, so the
purchaser must search the entire public record for deeds and other
recorded documents related to the property in question. 37 The
recording office maintains an index that pinpoints the location of
chronologically filed deeds, 38 but, in most jurisdictions, the index is
not organized by lot and block number. 39 Instead, the index is
cataloged alphabetically by the names of grantors and grantees. 40 As a
result, the purchaser must peruse the entire index for entries that
contain the names of all grantors or grantees that appear in the seller’s
chain of title. The index entry reveals the physical location of the
actual deed within the recording office. 41 The purchaser must then go
to the relevant location, typically a deed book, to examine the deed.
Unlike the English Land Registration Act, however, the inspection of
deeds is not limited to prospective purchasers of land. Indeed,
recorded deeds are accessible to anyone interested in looking at them.
Thus, the American recording system is premised on public access
because once a person has access to the deed books, she has access to
all deeds within the jurisdiction.

36 For a now-classic criticism of the American system, and advocacy of a registration
system, see Myres S. McDougal and John W. Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression,
48 YALE L.J. 1125 (1939).
37 State Recording Acts enumerate the types of instruments affecting title to real
property that are entitled to be recorded. Such instruments typically include deeds,
declarations of trust, long-term leases, mortgages, liens and encumbrances, assignments,
discharges, cancellations, releases, options, condemnation orders, tax and environmental
liability liens, restrictions governing the property’s use, notices of settlement, maps,
condominium master deeds, cooperative master declarations, and “any other document
that affects title to any interest in real property in any way or contains any agreement in
relation to real property, or grants any right or interest in real property or grants any lien
on real property.” E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:26A-2 (West 2021).
38 See 1 PALOMAR, supra note 24, § 67 (noting that the index is an essential element of
the recording system).
39 Tract indexes do exist in a number of states. In those states, the index entry for a
particular tract will direct the searcher to all documents related to that tract. Id.
40 Id. (noting that in the majority of older states, tract indexes do not exist; deeds are
indexed by grantor and grantee).
41 For a brief description of the process of using the indexes to search title, see
Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic
Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1365–66 (2010).
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B. Interests Protected by the System
The recording system’s protections both include and extend
beyond purchasers and prospective purchasers of fee interests in land.
Since colonial times, recording statutes have required mortgagees to
record in order to protect their interests against subsequent
purchasers and mortgagees. 42 Without mortgage lending, real property would be accessible only to the few people who could afford to pay
cash. The public land recording system facilitates the use of land as
collateral and opens the real estate market to a far wider audience. 43
Moreover, it is not only subsequent purchasers and mortgagees who
benefit from recording of mortgages; potential unsecured lenders can
check title records to determine how much equity a potential borrower
might have in the borrower’s real property, and therefore, how risky
an unsecured loan might be.
The recording system also serves an important role in the
regulation of easements by protecting individuals who record an
easement and by providing reassurance to possessors whose title search
reveals that they are not burdened by the obligations associated with
an easement. 44 Once an easement is created by deed, the easement
typically survives to benefit and burden subsequent owners, even
though the easement is not repeated in subsequent deeds. 45 Absent
recording, a subsequent owner would have no way of knowing whether
an easement created decades prior remained binding. The requirement that express easements be recorded provides a mechanism for
discovering old easements that were properly recorded, and for
avoiding unrecorded easements. 46

42 In 1639, for instance, Connecticut decreed that “all bargains and mortgages of
lands were to be put on record.” BENJAMIN TRUMBULL, A COMPLETE HISTORY OF
CONNECTICUT 115 (1818). In 1792, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania contrasted English
practice with Pennsylvania practice, noting that “[t]he law directs that mortgages shall be
recorded within six months, and any man may discover the incumbrances, if he will take
the trouble of searching the proper offices. If he will not, he must impute the consequences
to his own laches.” Evans v. Jones, 1 Yeates 172, 173 (Pa. 1792).
43 See Peterson, supra note 41, at 1364–65.
44 “An easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession
of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the
easement.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.2(1) (2000).
45 Charles Szypszak, Public Registries and Private Solutions: An Evolving American Real
Estate Conveyance Regime, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 663, 669 (2003).
46 See JON W. BRUCE AND JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN
LAND § 10:32 (1995). Similarly, upon modification or termination of an easement, the
party benefited by the modification or termination must record a release in order to protect
against claims by subsequent purchasers of the benefited land. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.15 (2000).
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Because of the variety of interests subject to the recording system,
it is no exaggeration to say that recording creates a network of
information that allows market and legal participants in the land
market to connect. 47 The public titling of land records, thus, creates a
legal infrastructure that is indispensable to parties seeking to transact
or protect an interest in real property. 48
C. Entity and Trust Ownership
Interests in land may be held by legal entities other than
individuals, such as corporations, LLCs, partnerships, and trusts.
These interests are indexed in the name of the legal entity or trustee,
so the identity of the beneficial owner is not part of the public record.
Title searchers may need to check other public records to verify the
authority of a person executing a deed on behalf of a legal entity, 49
however, for purposes of title assurance, searchers generally have little
reason to be concerned about the beneficial ownership of that entity.
Mortgages and liens, by contrast, are routinely sold or assigned by
the original holder of the interest, so prospective purchasers and
current fee owners must be capable of ascertaining parties with
authority to release or renegotiate a mortgage or other lien on the
property. When mortgage assignments are recorded promptly and
properly, the current holder of the mortgage can be located by
checking the public records. However, with the rise of mortgage
securitization in the 1990s, the public recording of mortgage interests
became opaque. Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and a host of private
leaders in the mortgage industry created the Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) to facilitate the private assignment
of mortgages outside the public recording system. 50 Under the MERS
system, the initial mortgagee would record the mortgage in the name
of MERS as nominee, and subsequent transfers would be memorialized

47 See Donald J. Kochan, Certainty of Title: Perspectives After the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis
on the Essential Role of Effective Recording Systems, 66 ARK. L. REV. 267, 275 (2013).
48 See Peterson, supra note 41, at 1365.
49 Typically, when the corporation is a seller, the buyer’s title searcher will consult the
records of the state Secretary of State to determine whether the corporation is in good
standing and will examine the certificate of incorporation to determine whether there are
limits on the corporation’s authority to transfer property. See, e.g., 21 N.J. PRAC., SKILLS
AND METHODS § 27:11 (3d ed.). When a corporation held title earlier in the chain of title,
a presumption may arise that transfer by the corporation was authorized. See, e.g., 1 N.C.
REAL ESTATE § 10:5 (3d ed.).
50 See Nolan Robinson, Note, The Case Against Allowing Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. (MERS) to Initiate Foreclosure Proceedings, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1621–22
(2011).
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electronically within the MERS system, but not in the public records. 51
As a result, a mortgagor seeking to pay off or renegotiate a mortgage
might not be able to rely on a search of the public records to locate
the current mortgagee. 52
In 2008, when the collapse of the subprime mortgage industry led
to widespread financial crisis, litigation mushroomed over whether
MERS had standing to foreclose mortgages held by its members. 53
Although MERS prevailed in many cases, 54 ultimately MERS
determined that foreclosure in the MERS name would not be
permitted, and that, before bringing a foreclosure proceeding, the
current mortgage holder would have to record the chain of
assignments in the recording office, restoring transparency about the
mortgager’s identity to the public record. 55
D. Local Nature of Recording
Deeds and other land records are typically recorded locally,
generally at the county level. Before the recent computerization of
records, the maintenance of separate indices for each county had
advantages from a title search perspective: the searcher would have
fewer index entries to examine than if the index included an entire
state. Perhaps more importantly, local recording offices are easily
accessible to those who are most likely to require access to public
records such as individuals seeking to record documents promptly or
perform a search title. In the parlance of a different era, it was critical
that recording offices be no more than one day’s horse ride away from
any closing. 56
With the advent of computerized land records, which we discuss
below, economies of scale could be achieved by recording at the state

51 Id. at 1622–23.
52 See MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 88 (2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting
in part):
[L]ack of disclosure may create substantial difficulty when a homeowner wishes
to negotiate the terms of his or her mortgage or enforce a legal right against the
mortgagee and is unable to learn the mortgagee’s identity. Public records will no
longer contain this information as, if it achieves the success it envisions, the MERS
system will render the public record useless by masking beneficial ownership of
mortgages and eliminating records of assignments altogether.
53 For a listing and discussion of cases, see 2 BAXTER DUNAWAY, LAW OF DISTRESSED
REAL ESTATE app. 24A.
54 Id.
55 2 DUNAWAY, supra note 53, § 24:20.10.
56 See Tanya Marsh, Foreclosures and the Failure of the American Land Title Recording
System, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 19, 25 (2011) (arguing that “[i]t is no longer important
that the recording office be located within one day’s horse ride of the county limits”).
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or federal level. 57 But the traditional local system is politically entrenched because county clerks and other officials supervising the land
recording system are typically elected officeholders who are unlikely to
relinquish their duties voluntarily. 58 Fortunately, the county-based
system does continue to offer some benefits, such as the ability of local
officials to provide users with valuable advice. 59
Although American land records have always been open to the
public, the intensely local nature of the recording system has limited
the audience for these records largely to those the recording system
was designed to benefit: prospective purchasers and lenders and their
representatives. Local realtors and tax authorities had reason to
consult the records for information about sales and sale prices, 60 but
for national firms seeking to mine data for other purposes, the
cumbersome process of visiting, on a regular basis, each county
recording office across the country served as an effective deterrent.
II.

PUBLIC LAND RECORDS TODAY

The modern functions of public land records have strayed
dramatically from the original purpose of deterring fraud in the
conveyance of real property. Today, access to public land records is
increasingly privatized, digitized, and commercialized, largely in
response to the meteoric growth in demand for personal data. This
Part will examine the emergence of title insurance companies and
their development of private “title plants,” the digitization of public
land records, and new technological innovations such as big data
algorithms and web harvesters that enable commercial interests to
profit from information extracted from public land records.
A. Private Title Plants and the Computerization of Public Land Records
Historically, the primary users of public land records were
specialists, such as title abstractors and lawyers who had to compile the
ownership history of a particular parcel in order to assure their clients

57 See Charles Szypszak, Local Government Registers of Deeds and the Enduring Reliance on
Common Sense Judgment in a Technocratic Tide, 44 REAL EST. L.J. 351, 355–56 (2015)
(discussing statewide consolidation); Marsh, supra note 56, at 25 (arguing for federalization
of recording system).
58 Marsh, supra note 56, at 25.
59 Szypszak, supra note 57, at 356.
60 For instance, New York State imposes both a tax on real estate transfers, N.Y. Tax
Law § 1402 (McKinney 2021), and a tax on the value of recorded mortgages. Id. §§ 253,
253-a to 253-y.
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about the state of title. 61 Sometimes, however, those specialists made
mistakes. When courts held that the specialists were not liable for
errors in judgment made during the process of abstracting title, 62 a
private market for title insurance slowly began to develop. 63 That
market grew after World War I (largely because of the demands of
institutional lenders), 64 and after World War II, title insurance became
the norm for real estate transactions. 65
Some title insurance companies did more than search the public
records as a prelude to underwriting individual title policies. In a
trend driven primarily by the major firms, several title insurance
carriers enhanced their search efficiency by developing proprietary
databases of property information known as “title plants.” Title plants
are private deed banks that reproduce property data from the public
record, but allow for better indexing and organization, and more
complete information about the state of title. 66 Title plants have to be
updated with a daily check of new public filings, 67 but once assembled,
the data collector need not review public records for transactions
already contained in the title plant. 68 Building and maintaining large

61 See Moses K. Rosenberg, Historical Perspective of the Development of Rate Regulation of
Title Insurance, 44 J. RISK AND INS. 193, 196 (1977).
62 Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161, 166 (1868) held that a professional abstractor’s
conduct “is not necessarily to be judged by the result. It is rather to be tested by considering
what was the best light to be had at the time, and whether the error, if he committed one,
was the result of an excusable mistake or of negligence.”
63 Pennsylvania enacted a statute authorizing title insurance in 1874 (six years after
the Watson case was decided), and the first title insurance company was formed two years
later. See G. Stacy Sirmans & Randy E. Dumm, Title Insurance: An Historical Perspective, 14 J.
REAL EST. LIT. 293, 294 (2006).
64 See Rosenberg, supra note 61, at 197.
65 See Quintin Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L. J. 492 (1956) (noting large
increase in title insurance since the mid-1940s, especially in urban areas); Sirmans &
Dumm, supra note 63, at 294; Stewart E. Sterk, Title Insurance: Protecting Property at What
Price?, 99 WASH. U. L. REV. 519, 524–27 (2021) (discussing development of the title
insurance industry).
66 See 3 MILLER & STARR CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 7:20 (4th ed. 2015), Westlaw
MILCALRE (describing operation of title plant) [hereinafter 3 CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE].
For a description of a title plant, see BARLOW BURKE, LAW OF TITLE INSURANCE § 12.01 (3d
ed. Supp. 2018-2).
67 See BURKE, supra note 66, § 12.01 (noting that the title plant is “compiled and
indexed on a daily basis from the public records relating to all real estate transactions filed
with the Register of Deeds’ office and other county offices in the county in which the title
plant is to be used” (quoting McCaffree Fin. Corp. v. Nunnick, 847 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1993)).
68 Because the title plant will include all past preliminary reports or searches on any
parcel, the title company will typically start a new search with its last preliminary report or
search, and will then update that report or search. 3 CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE, supra note
66, § 7:20.
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databases of land records is highly labor intensive. 69 Those formidable
costs led to consolidation in a title insurance industry now dominated
by four companies that account for 85 percent of all title insurance
policies nationwide. 70 Thus, all major title insurers maintain efficient
and readily accessible databanks that contain information about title
to and mortgages upon land throughout much of the country.
Although title insurers compiled title plants in pursuit of their
core insurance business, they soon realized that they possessed
information of great economic value to businesses in other industries
that could benefit from PII contained in real property deeds. In the
1980s, some title insurers sought to commercialize this data by selling
direct wholesale access to their title plants. 71 And, as commercial data
markets gained momentum, title insurance companies acted to
develop title plants in areas they had not previously exploited. Their
efforts, however, encountered opposition from local deed recording
officials who initially resisted the bulk production of electronic land
records on privacy grounds.
Two of the early privacy challenges, one in New York and the
other in Kansas, involved Data Tree, LLC (Data Tree), a subsidiary of

69 See Johnstone, supra note 65, at 507 (“Title plants are costly to maintain, for every
day a large volume of instruments must be copied and transactions indexed if the plant is
to remain current.”). To spread the cost of title plants, title insurers sometimes agree to
share title plant information. See, e.g., Safeco Title Ins. Co. v. Liberty Nat. Title Ins. Co., No.
88 C 1687, 1989 WL 11079 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 1989) (discussing a sharing arrangement).
Because title plants are valuable assets that can operate to restrain competition in local
markets, they sometimes play a role in FTC approval of agreements by one title insurer to
acquire another insurer or another insurer’s business. See, e.g., Jad Chamseddine, FTC
Wants Fidelity National to Sell Title Plants, CQ ROLL CALL WASH. MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
BRIEFING, Apr. 30, 2014, 2014 WL 1688451.
70 See Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 798 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that, in
most states, title insurance is dominated by two or three companies); Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, FTC Challenges Proposed $1.2 Billion Merger of Title Insurance Providers
Fidelity National Financial, Inc. and Stewart Information Services Corporation (Sept. 6,
2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/09/ftc-challenges-proposed12-billion-merger-title-insurance [https://perma.cc/36H2-SXLQ]; cf. 1 JOYCE PALOMAR,
TITLE INSURANCE LAW § 2.2 (3d ed. 2003) (noting that although local title insurers initially
built title plants, “national underwriters today have amassed data from public records into
their own electronic title plants that are searchable from anywhere”).
71 First American Corporation, one of the “Big 4” title insurers, advertises a product
called “Title Chain and Lien Report” that “is accessed directly from [First American’s] title
plants.” See DataTree, FIRST AM. MORTG. SOLS., https://www.firstam.com/mortgage
solutions/solutions/data-analytics/datatree.html [https://perma.cc/C86Q-FANW]; Title
Chain and Lien Report, FIRST AM. DATA & ANALYTICS, https://dna.firstam.com/title-chainand-lien-report-sample [https://perma.cc/E28S-CLV4]; The Source of Confidence, FIRST AM.
DATA TREE, https://web.archive.org/web/20110708233737/http://www.datatree.com
/about_us.asp (noting Data Tree’s establishment in 1987).
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First American Corporation, one of the “Big 4” title insurers. 72 Data
Tree claims to be
the nation’s leading provider of business information by supplying
businesses and consumers with the information and resources that
affect the major economic events of peoples’ lives such as getting a
job; renting an apartment; buying a car, house, boat, or airplane;
securing a mortgage; opening or buying a business; and planning
for retirement. 73

Both cases reached the highest court of the state. In each case,
Data Tree argued that it was entitled to electronic land records under
the state’s freedom of information law. 74 Although there were significant differences between the cases, they shared some common
outcomes: courts in both actions held that Data Tree was not entitled
to certain PII such as social security numbers, that Data Tree was
entitled to non-confidential information including information
pertaining to the ownership and encumbrance of real property, and
that Data Tree would have to bear the recording office’s cost of
redacting confidential information.
In the New York case, Data Tree requested twenty years of real
property filings in an electronic format from the Suffolk County, New
York, County Clerk. 75 The county clerk denied Data Tree’s request on
the ground that “disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy due to the volume of the records requested and the
commercial nature of Data Tree’s business.”76 Data Tree then brought

72 See Data Tree, LLC v. Romaine, 880 N.E.2d 10, 13 (N.Y. 2007); Data Tree, LLC v.
Meek, 109 P.3d 1226, 1230 (Kan. 2005).
73 Meek, 109 P.3d at 1230.
74 The New York Court of Appeals observed:
Data Tree is a national company that provides on-line public land records such as
deeds, mortgages, liens, judgments, releases and maps, and maintains a database
of nearly two billion documents, providing its customers with immediate
electronic access to the information. Its customers are those entities who
purchase, sell, finance and insure property. Data Tree obtains the public land
records by requesting them from county clerks, or other public officials who have
the responsibility of recording and archiving such documents, throughout the
country.
Romaine, 880 N.E.2d at 13. New York’s open public records mandate applies to “any
information kept, held, filed, produced or reproduced by, with or for an agency or the state
legislature, in any physical form whatsoever including, but not limited to, reports,
statements, examinations, memoranda, opinions, folders, files, books, manuals, pamphlets,
forms, papers, designs, drawings, maps, photos, letters, microfilms, computer tapes or discs,
rules, regulations or codes.” N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 86(4) (McKinney 2021).
75 Romaine, 880 N.E.2d at 13 (Data Tree sought “[t]iff images or images in the
electronic format regularly maintained by the County . . . on CD–ROM or other electronic
storage medium regularly used by the County.”).
76 Id.
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a civil action in state court to compel production. After years of
litigation, the New York Court of Appeals held that the county clerk
had failed to rebut the presumption in favor of disclosure under New
York’s open public records statute. 77 To overcome that presumption,
the county clerk had to “articulat[e] a particularized and specific
justification for denying access” based on “unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.”78 Noting the custodian’s burden of establishing a
disclosure exemption, the court emphasized that “Data Tree’s
commercial motive for seeking the records is . . . irrelevant in this case
and constitutes an improper basis for denying the [Freedom of
Information Law] request.” 79 In deeming Data Tree’s commercial
motive irrelevant, the court explained that the state’s freedom of
information law did not permit the disclosure of public land records
for the purpose of generating leads for direct solicitation calls, but that
the statute did allow such disclosure for the general purpose of
“commercial reproduction on line.” 80 On remand, the Court of
Appeals ordered the trial court to determine whether Data Tree’s
specific requests sought the disclosure of exempt PII, such as Social
Security numbers and birthdates. 81 Because the New York statute
provides that a state agency may recover the actual cost of reproducing
requested records, 82 Data Tree would presumably be liable for the cost
of redacting the PII to which it was not entitled.
In Kansas, a local district attorney investigated a series of
unsolicited sales calls that some complainants believed came from Data
Tree’s marketing of PII extracted from public land records. 83 The
district attorney eventually closed the investigation without any adverse
finding against Data Tree, although the company voluntarily modified
its public records requests to exclude some highly sensitive PII. 84 In
2002, Data Tree petitioned the Sedgwick County, Kansas, Register of
Deeds for bulk production of land records and expressly excluded all
“birth records, marriage certificates, and military discharges” from its

77 Id. at 15.
78 Id. (first quoting Cap. Newspapers Div. of Hearst Corp. v. Burns, 67 N.E.2d 665, 667
(N.Y. 1986); and then quoting N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(b) (McKinney 2021)).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 16.
81 Id.
82 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(b) (McKinney) (entitling an agency to recover actual
cost). Section 87(c) defines actual cost to include the “hourly salary attributed to the lowest
paid agency employee who has the necessary skill required to prepare a copy of the
requested record” or, if the agency’s technology is inadequate, “the actual cost to the
agency of engaging an outside professional service to prepare a copy of a record.” Id.
83 Data Tree, LLC v. Meek, 109 P.3d 1226, 1230 (2005).
84 Id.
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request. 85 The county register conditioned the production of records
on Data Tree’s execution of “an affidavit prohibiting the selling or
offering for sale any lists of names and addresses derived from public
records.”86 Data Tree initially objected but ultimately complied.87
One month later, the Sedgwick County Register informed Data
Tree “that many of the requested records contained personally
identifying information such as social security numbers, mothers’
maiden names, and dates of births which needed to be redacted from
the records.”88 The Register stated that it would charge Data Tree
$22,050 for the cost of “converting the microfilm to digital information
in order to remove or redact the portions that were confidential and
not subject to release.” 89 While the Kansas open public records statute
did not expressly prohibit government officials from disclosing
personal information, the Register claimed it was exercising discretion
conferred by statute to exempt from disclosure “records containing
information of a personal nature where the public disclosure thereof
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”90
In response, Data Tree filed a civil action challenging the
redaction surcharges in state court and, as in New York, litigated the
dispute all the way up to the state supreme court. Like the New York
Court of Appeals, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that the
county register could withhold information of a personal nature,
including “social security numbers, mothers’ maiden names, and dates
of births.” 91 The court expressed general disapproval of the disclosure
of real property deeds for commercial publication online, cautioning
that “[t]he public interest to be served by releasing unredacted
documents . . . to a data collection company which intends to sell this
information for a profit is at best insignificant.” 92 But in holding that
the county register did not abuse its discretion by requiring that
personal information be redacted, the court left Data Tree with the
right to obtain redacted records so long as the company was willing to
bear the cost of redaction. 93
The distinction drawn by courts between the disclosure of public
land records for the impermissible purpose of lead generation for
direct solicitation and the permissible purpose of “commercial

85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1231.
Id.
Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-221(a)(30) (2005)).
Id. at 1230, 1238.
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1240.
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reproduction on line”94 proved to be meaningless. Once land records
are produced online, purchasers of that information cannot be
prevented from using the data for the purpose of generating leads or
other customer prospecting activities. Thus, while local deed
recorders initially stood at the vanguard of opposition against the
commercialization of data extracted from public land records, their
opposition was neither effective nor long-lasting. Deed recorders soon
realized that, with the advent of electronic filing, they could no longer
maintain land records solely in hard copy and that, by digitizing their
vast inventories of real property filings, they could generate revenue by
charging users for electronic access. Deed recorders are now part of a
growing cohort of state agencies that sell PII from public records for
the purpose of generating governmental revenues. 95
Notably, fees generated by the sale of electronic access to the deed
recording system played a critical role in financing the cost of
digitizing real property deeds. Until recently, most county recording
offices had avoided the burden and cost of computerizing public land
records traditionally maintained in paper and microfilm media
because they lacked the financial incentives that pushed title insurers
to modernize their recordkeeping systems. As courts and other
governmental agencies shifted to electronic filing procedures, the
public began to expect local recording offices to follow suit. To that
end, in 2004, the Uniform Law Commission promulgated the Uniform
Real Property Electronic Recording Act (URPERA), which, among
other reforms, expressly validated the electronic recording of public
land records. 96
Drafters of the URPERA, which has since been enacted in thirtysix states, 97 anticipated that the shift to electronic land records would

94 Data Tree, LLC v. Romaine, 880 N.E.2d 10, 16 (N.Y. 2007).
95 See, e.g., Joseph Cox, The California DMV Is Making $50M a Year Selling Drivers’
Personal Information, VICE (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/evjekz
/the-california-dmv-is-making-dollar50m-a-year-selling-drivers-personalinformation?_ga=2.179775204.1520908975.1599772629-202134210.1599772629 [https://
perma.cc/F9X9-47UB] (“A document obtained by Motherboard shows how DMVs sell
people’s names, addresses, and other personal information to generate revenue.”).
96 UNIF. REAL PROP. ELEC. RECORDING ACT, prefatory note (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2004)
(“The Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act was drafted to remove any doubt
about the authority of the recorder to receive and record documents and information in
electronic form. Its fundamental principle is that any requirements of state law describing
or requiring that a document be an original, on paper, or in writing are satisfied by a
document in electronic form.”).
97 Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://
www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?communitykey=643c99ad-6abf-40469da4-0a6367da00cc&tab=gropudetails [https://perma.cc/NT9T-6S64].
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be costly, but they abstained from recommending how local deed
recorders should pay for those costs:
The establishment, and perhaps the operation, of an electronic
recording system might be funded from the general taxes and
revenues of the state or county. Because of the relatively large
“front end” expenses needed to set up an electronic recording
system, this approach might be very appropriate for that purpose.
Whether the funding is to be by the county or the state is an issue
that should be resolved prior to the passage of this act. A related
question is whether the funding should cover the entire cost of
setting up the system or only part of it with the remaining costs to
be paid by recording and searching fees dedicated to the
establishment of the electronic recording system. 98

Rather than seek state appropriations, many deed recorders
contracted with private vendors on a revenue-sharing basis to pay for
the cost of electronic conversion. 99 Under that model, deed recorders
avoided expending scarce budgetary resources on the digitization of
land records while also generating new revenue by charging users for
online access. 100 Some municipalities implemented a hybrid model,
providing free, limited access to electronic land records for individuals
while charging a subscription fee for bulk downloading activity by
commercial users. 101
98 UNIF. REAL PROP. ELEC. RECORDING ACT, prefatory note (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2004).
99 The Hubbard County, Minnesota deed recorder explained:
Counties are capturing a lot of revenue off this data because it is very valuable[.]
I like to think of it like our timber. We don’t just give away our timber. It’s a
resource for our taxpayers. We should be bringing some of that revenue back to
the taxpayers. . . . There is a lot of revenue potential here.
Shannon M. Geisen, Fidlar Technologies Will Market, Sell Hubbard County Land Records, PARK
RAPIDS ENTER. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.parkrapidsenterprise.com/4534766-fidlartechnologies-will-market-sell-hubbard-county-land [https://perma.cc/V4TJ-MQBJ]. See
also Venkat Balasubramani, Company That Facilitates Digital Access to Public Records Uses CFAA
to Block Scraper, ERIC GOLDMAN: TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Dec. 31, 2013), https://
blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/12/company-that-facilitates-digital-access-to-publicrecords-uses-cfaa-to-block-scraper.htm [https://perma.cc/4RQQ-S5U3] (“[T]he fact that
counties are allowed to erect what is essentially a paywall around public records is deeply
disconcerting. The fact that Fidlar seems to overtly promote this as a revenue model to
governmental entities is downright crazy.”).
100 See Geisen, supra note 98 (describing a pilot program in which a corporate
customer was “buying bulk data from the county”). The county recorder explained, “[Data
purchasers] want the entire month or entire year in one shot on an FTP drive or Zip drive.
They want a big download.” Id.
101 New York City, for example, “restrict[s] the daily bandwidth utilization to 400 MB”
and “restricts access to users of robots, automatic scripts and other methods that consume
excessive bandwidth to download information.” See ACRIS: Bandwidth Utilization Restrictions,
N.Y.C. DEP’T OF FIN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/finance/taxes/acris.page [https://
perma.cc/94BP-N5SL]. “High-volume users should contact the City Register to establish
data subscription services that have been specifically designed to support such traffic.” Id.

WEISBORD_STERK_03_23.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

528

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

3/23/2022 3:48 PM

[VOL. 97:2

Private vendors, in turn, played a central role in the digitization
and commercialization of public land records. Fidlar Technologies,
for instance, is one of the leading vendors that provides hardware,
software, and subscriber management services to approximately two
hundred local deed recording agencies. 102 In counties that contract
with Fidlar, users seeking online access to public land records generally
must interface with Fidlar’s database management system. One of
Fidlar’s popular branded services, known as the “Laredo Program,”
charges subscribers a monthly fee for unlimited access to the county
database for the purpose of searching and viewing property records,
plus an additional fee for printing images of individual files.103 Fidlar,
in turn, splits the fee revenue with the county government. 104
In sum, having opened the door to electronic recordkeeping,
many local deed recorders established a new source of revenue from
the sale of electronic access to public land records, but, in doing so,
they inadvertently compromised the privacy of individual homeowners. Once deed registers migrated from manual to electronic filing,
land records became publicly accessible online and searchable by
address or lot number without the need to identify a grantor or
grantee. 105 As we explain in the next section, the digitization and
electronic searchability of public land records have fed an insatiable
demand for PII in the booming market for big data.
B. Big Data and Web Harvesting
The commercialization of homeowners’ PII has been driven
largely by the growing demand for big data, one of the most significant
technological innovations to emerge from the dot-com collapse in
2001. “Big data” generally refers to computer algorithms that process
enormous quantities of data for the purpose of predicting future

102 See Complaint, Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., 4:13-cv-04021 (C.D.
Ill., filed Mar. 11, 2013), 2013 WL 878345 at 1–2.
103 Id. at 2–3
104 Id.
105 See Emily Bayer-Pacht, Note, The Computerization of Land Records: How Advances in
Recording Systems Affect the Rationale Behind Some Existing Chain of Title Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 337, 339 (2010) (noting the trend towards searchable records in many counties);
see also Teranet, About POLARIS [Province of Ontario Land Registration Information System],
https://www.teranet.ca/registry-solutions/about-polaris/
[https://perma.cc/4MYERP4X] (describing the development of the first electronic land registration system in 1985);
Wake County Register of Deeds, Why Data Is Available Online, http://www.wakegov.com/rod
/help/land/Pages/Books/dataonline.aspx [https://perma.cc/XJ8A-8E6Y] (noting the
online publication of property records beginning in 1999).
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behavior. 106 Those algorithms aggregate and commodify vast data
collections in ways that have proven immensely valuable in the modern
information economy. In 2019, firms spent $67 billion on big data for
various commercial purposes, such as targeted advertising and
consumer marketing services. 107 Much of that information comes from
local governments, which supply PII revealed in property tax records,
deeds, property liens, mortgages and mortgage releases, and
foreclosure filings. 108 That information is, in turn, transformed into a
commodity when it is extracted from the actual land record images
and stored in database form so that it can be aggregated and processed
by big data algorithms. To accelerate the data extraction and avoid
labor costs associated with manual data entry, big data firms now use a
process known as “web harvesting” to automate the electronic
collection of relevant data fields. 109 Web harvesting utilizes bot technology to search for, collect, and assemble small pieces of information
from the internet. 110
106 See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure
with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1434–35 (2014) (citing Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward
a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2021 (2013)).
107 See Shanhong Liu, Big Data and Analytics Software Market Worldwide 2011–2019,
STATISTA (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/472934/business-analyticssoftware-revenue-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/TF84-4F4B]; see also Porat & Strahilevitz,
supra note 106, at 1435–36; Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact,
104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 673 (2016).
108 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 11–12 (2014).
109 Cf., Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., 810 F.3d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir.
2016) (noting that web harvesters are “not interested in the land records themselves, but
rather the data in these records”).
110 One commentator offers the following description of web harvesting technology:
One such method is data (or web) scraping, which involves software applications,
called “bots,” that efficiently collect information from across the internet. By
automating the web browsing process, scraping bots gather data in the same
format as it appears on a user’s computer screen. Scraping bots serve an
indispensable function for internet companies ranging from analytics startups to
the internet’s most established firms. Search engines, such as Google and Bing,
use web crawler bots to catalog public websites. Analytics startups draw insights
for industries, ranging from finance to retail, using public data gathered by bots.
Estimates show that bots account for nearly one quarter of all internet traffic, and
they have contributed significantly to the web’s development.
Ioannis Drivas, Comment, Liability for Data Scraping Prohibitions Under the Refusal to Deal
Doctrine: An Incremental Step Toward More Robust Sherman Act Enforcement, 86 U. CHI. L. REV.
1901, 1903–04 (2019); see also Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp.
2d 537, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[Web] crawlers extract and download content from the
websites. The downloaded content is organized into a structured internal format . . . .”);
Nandhini, Watch Out: How Real Estate Scraping Is Taking Over and Why They Matter,
SCRAPEWORKS,
https://scrape.works/blog/watch-real-estate-scraping-taking-matter
[https://perma.cc/8KJD-T5P8].
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Web harvesting of public land records is typically most profitable
when electronic images can be captured or, better yet, relevant data
can be extracted from deeds and liens without purchasing each
underlying property filing on a per-unit basis. As described below, web
crawlers are programmed to exploit fixed-price subscriptions that
provide unlimited searching privileges without incurring fees for
downloading each individual record. County governments, with the
help of their electronic records management vendors, try mightily to
thwart this practice because image download fees generate significant
revenues from high-volume big data users when conducting this type
of data query on an industrial scale. Recent litigation of disputes about
web harvesting and the use of online subscription services offers a
revealing account of how technology firms are commodifying real
property information into big data.
A notable series of cases involved a harvester of land records
known as Black Knight, which had previously operated under the
name Lender Processing Services (LPS). 111 Black Knight, a subsidiary
of title insurance giant Fidelity National Financial, Inc., collects land
records on a “vast scale” and maintains “agreements to access public
land title information with about 2,600 county recorders’ offices
nationwide.”112 Using software furnished by the counties’ electronic
records vendors, such as Fidlar, Black Knight harvests land records by
generating a series of targeted queries and saving each document that
it retrieves. 113 It then sends the downloaded land records to India,
where workers manually extract certain fields of information and enter

111 See About Black Knight, Inc., BLACK KNIGHT, https://www.blackknightinc.com
/about-black-knight/ [https://perma.cc/P548-7ENB] (noting the 2008 subsidiary spinoff
of Lender Processing Services, Inc. by Fidelity National Financial, which later reacquired
LPS and renamed the entity Black Knight Technologies).
112 Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 844, 847 (C.D. Ill.
2015), aff’d, 810 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Some counties used written contracts; others
had sign-up sheets or other less formal means of arranging for access. Where counties
priced access differently based on the number of minutes of time logged searching land
records, LPS paid the counties the fee required for the maximum amount of time possible,
or ‘unlimited’ time.”).
113 Fidlar Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d at 848. A federal appellate court described three
distinct features of Black Knight’s web harvester:
First, the web-harvester allowed [Black Knight] to acquire records en masse rather
than viewing or printing them one at a time. Second, the web-harvester allowed
[Black Knight] to download or save records, an option not available in [Fidlar’s]
Laredo client. Third, [Black Knight’s] web-harvester did not send any tracking
data at all and did not register any print fees, even if [Black Knight] downloaded
or saved a record.
Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., 810 F.3d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir. 2016).

WEISBORD_STERK_03_23.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

3/23/2022 3:48 PM

THE COMMODIFICATION OF PUBLIC LAND RECORDS

531

the data into a proprietary database. 114 Finally, Black Knight packages
the extracted data for sale to companies engaged in various
commercial activities including mortgage lending, real estate sales,
capital market investing, direct marketing, and insurance. 115
Fidlar recently challenged Black Knight’s web harvesting practice
in a federal civil action that alleged that Black Knight’s search protocol
violated Fidlar’s user agreement as well as federal and state prohibitions against computer fraud and tampering. 116 Fidlar claimed that its
subscription program was designed to charge for timed access to the
database and, additionally, to impose print fees for each downloaded
record. 117 Black Knight purchased an unlimited time subscription,
which did not include downloading privileges, and then used its web
harvester to capture images of individual land records en masse
without being detected by Fidlar’s paywall. 118 Fidlar claimed that the
web harvester exploited a programming flaw that allowed Black Knight
to obtain complete land records without incurring print fees for each
individual filing. 119 Black Knight countered that the user agreements
that it entered into with the county governments and with Fidlar did
not expressly prohibit web harvesting. It claimed further that Fidlar
knew that two of Black Knight’s competitors, CoreLogic and First
American (Data Tree), were also using web harvesters to download
land records in bulk without paying individual printing fees, “yet
[Fidlar] did not do anything to stop it.” 120

114 Fidlar Techs., 810 F.3d at 1078. There are also patented technologies that help
automate the process of data mining information from property records. See, e.g., System
and Method for Associating Aerial Images, Map Features, and Information, U.S. Patent No.
7,487,114 at [43] (issued Feb. 3, 2009) (describing “automated data source services that
digitally record information and automatically transmit the information to data mining
applications”).
115 See Black Knight Technologies, LLC, Industries, https://www.sitexdata.com/Home
/Industries [https://perma.cc/DZY5-EBGH].
116 Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., 810 F.3d 1075, 1079 (7th Cir. 2016).
117 Id. at 1077–78.
118 Id. at 1078 (Black Knight “designed a ‘web-harvester,’ a computer program to
download county records en masse. To create the web-harvester, [Black Knight] ran a
number of standard record searches and used a ‘traffic analyzer’ to view the [Simple Object
Access Protocol “SOAP”] calls sent from the client to the middle tier. [Black Knight] then
identified the SOAP calls necessary to retrieve records and developed its own client, the
web-harvester, to emulate those SOAP calls and send them to the middle tier. [Black
Knight’s] web-harvester only sent the SOAP calls necessary to retrieve records; it did not
send other SOAP calls, such as those that track a user’s activity. But every SOAP call did
include [Black Knight’s] unique identifier assigned by each county.”).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1082.
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Black Knight prevailed on summary judgment and successfully
defended that ruling on appeal. 121 The Seventh Circuit upheld Black
Knight’s use of its web harvester, finding that it did not breach the user
agreement, violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. §
1030) (CFAA), or trigger CFAA’s civil remedy provision (18 U.S.C. §
1030(g)). 122 Section 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA prohibits “knowingly and
with intent to defraud, access[ing] a protected computer without
authorization, or exceed[ing] authorized access, and by means of such
conduct further[ing] the intended fraud and obtain[ing] anything of
value.”123 The Seventh Circuit held that no reasonable juror could find
that Black Knight intended to defraud Fidlar because the evidence
showed that Black Knight had used its web harvester “to accelerate its
data acquisition efforts,” not primarily for the purpose of evading print
fees, and that operation of the web harvester had not been concealed
from Fidlar’s software. 124 “In fact, each of [Black Knight’s] SOAP
requests contained its unique identifier.” 125 With this holding, web
harvesting of public land records seems to be a legal practice governed
only by the contractual terms of the vendor’s user agreement and by
the technological mechanisms installed by the vendor to enforce those
terms. Thus, when a vendor fails to properly safeguard the paywall,
web harvesters can lawfully outsmart the system to collect data without
paying either the vendor or the county government.
Web harvesters must also exercise care in designing their search
bots because they are contractually responsible for all of their activities
on the electronic public records user interface. Programming defects,
such as queries that inadvertently trigger print fees for each requested
record, have proven to be costly mistakes for web harvesters and a
windfall for county governments and their electronic records vendors.
In 2012, for example, Data Tree used its web harvester to download

121 Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 844 (C.D. Ill. 2015),
aff’d, 810 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2016).
122 Fidlar Techs., 810 F.3d at 1084 (“Fidlar attempts to convert its failure to prohibit
[Black Knight’s] action by contract into an allegation of criminal conduct. Despite its
extensive efforts to paint [Black Knight’s] conduct as fraudulent in nature, Fidlar has not
pointed to any evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that [Black Knight]
believed its conduct was fraudulent.”).
123 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). The CFAA’s regulation of web collection activities,
however, remains in flux. The Ninth Circuit recently rejected LinkedIn’s invocation of the
CFAA to terminate a web harvester’s access to publicly available user profiles. hiQ Labs,
Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1005 (9th Cir. 2019), vacated 141 S. Ct. 2752 (2021)
(mem.). The Supreme Court, however, recently held that the CFAA does not prohibit an
authorized user from accessing restricted information for an improper purpose. Van Buren
v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021).
124 Fidlar Techs., 810 F.3d at 1080.
125 Id. at 1080–81.
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more than 68,000 land records in St. Clair County, Illinois. 126 But
instead of subscribing to Fidlar’s Laredo service, which provides
unlimited untimed access for search query activity, Data Tree
inadvertently subscribed to Fidlar’s “Tapestry” service, which charges
a fee for every search. 127 Under Fidlar’s contract with St. Clair,
Tapestry subscribers pay a fee of $5.95 per search, of which Fidlar
keeps $3.70 for itself and remits $2.25 to St. Clair. 128 At the end of Data
Tree’s billing period, “a representative of Fidlar called Data Tree to
thank it for its business and [to] see if Data Tree would like to pay in
installments” the outstanding $404,719.50 invoice for searches in St.
Clair County. 129 When Data Tree refused, Fidlar remitted $153,045.25
to St. Clair for the county’s share and sued Data Tree for the unpaid
invoice. 130 Data Tree claimed that Fidlar’s fees were unenforceable
because the state’s freedom of information act did “not allow counties
to charge a fee for electronic access to public land records in excess of
the cost of the recording medium.” 131 However, the court disagreed
because, under the Illinois Uniform Real Property Electronic
Recording Act, “the county board may adopt a fee for document detail
or image retrieval on the Internet.” 132 Thus, the court found that St.
Clair County had properly established its fees for electronic records
retrieval under the statute and, consequently, that Fidlar was entitled
to enforce its contract with Data Tree for the full amount of search
charges incurred by Data Tree’s web harvester. 133
The Fidlar cases show that local deed recorders are now actively
engaged in the business of selling electronic public land records to web
harvesters and, further, that the acquisition of public land records by
web harvesters is governed by private contracts and user agreements
that are enforceable under state law. The deed recording system, with
the help of private vendors and at the request of commercial data
brokers, has come to embrace its new role of PII supplier in the market
for big data.
C. Commercial Uses of Online Property Data
Information gleaned from public land records has long been
exploited for commercial purposes unrelated to the purchase or
126 Fidlar Acquisition Co. v. First Am. Data Tree LLC, No. 4:12-cv-04099, 2016 WL
1259377, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2016).
127 Id.
128 Id. at *2.
129 Id. at *3.
130 Id.
131 Id. at *6.
132 Id. at *7.
133 Id. at *10.
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encumbrance of real property. 134 Before the digitization of land
records and the advent of big data, businesses routinely engaged in the
collection of PII, but they typically procured that information, not en
masse on an industrial scale, but rather, on a transactional basis. For
example, when a consumer applies for credit in connection with the
purchase of a good or service, the lender might request (or otherwise
obtain through an intermediary, such as a credit rating bureau)
personal information extracted from a public land record necessary to
evaluate the borrower’s creditworthiness. The lender uses information
about the consumer’s interest in real property for a commercial
purpose unrelated to the property itself, but the impetus for the
inquiry is the desire to consummate a specific transaction at the
consumer’s request.
Big data, however, fundamentally altered the commercial utility
of PII for large businesses. Rather than using information from land
records in connection with individual real estate transactions,
businesses could aggregate that data on an industrial scale and deploy
algorithms that render PII collected from deeds commercially
exploitable in myriad ways. As a result, individuals are now inundated
by a relentless stream of unsolicited, highly customized, communications about products, services, and jobs in a seemingly endless stream
of invitations to transact. Many of those solicitations are generated
from PII, including the target’s name, marital status, and home
address, compiled from digitized public land records.
Another big data application involves the online sale of property
ownership information to consumers searching the internet for PII
belonging to a particular individual—the type of service denounced by
Judge Salas. Several online data brokers offer background checking
services that furnish customers with a comprehensive report of nearly
all PII about a particular target that can be obtained from public
sources. Consider, for example, the suite of services provided by
Intelius, Inc., a big data broker owned by a private equity firm. 135
Intelius advertises a database spanning “over 20 billion available public
records” and invites consumers to search for the “phone numbers,
address history, age, birthdate, email addresses, social network profiles,

134 The invocation of freedom of information laws to obtain and commercialize the
contents of public records has become widespread in other business contexts. See Margaret
B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361 (2016) (surveying commercial uses for public
records obtained from the SEC, FDA, EPA, DLA, FTC, and NIH under the federal Freedom
of Information Act).
135 H.I.G. Capital Completes Acquisition of Intelius, BUS. WIRE (July 7, 2015, 6:00 AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150707005394/en/H.I.G.-CapitalCompletes-Acquisition-Intelius [https://perma.cc/HD47-2NYW]; INTELIUS, https://
www.intelius.com [https://perma.cc/QVL6-VZXL].
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[and] marriage & divorce records” of “someone in [their lives].” 136
Intelius promotes its service as a one-stop solution for public record
queries, enabling its customers to “[a]void the hassle of having to track
down each public record separately, and get the convenience of one
comprehensive search.”137 Intelius states that it collects information,
including real estate records, from public records maintained by
“county, state and federal” courts and government offices. 138 Intelius
also advertises proprietary technology that “analyze[s] public data to
reveal possible relationships, even when official records aren’t
available.”139
A competing firm, MyLife.com, Inc., markets many of the same
services as Intelius, but it also caters to consumers seeking to monitor
their own online reputation and data footprint. One of the data
sources from which MyLife claims to obtain PII is public land
records. 140 MyLife’s landing page advertises the following slogan:
“Reputation is Everything. See & Improve Your Public Reputation
Profile.”141 MyLife assigns each person a “Public Reputation Score,”
an opaque numerical computation (scaled from 1.0 to 5.0) that the
company claims is “based on background details, personal reviews and
social media posts, and are constantly updated.” 142 Subscribers to
MyLife’s free service receive ominous emails claiming that “We Found
a Negative Item on your Reputation Profile” and warning that
“Negative Items on Your Reputation Profile can affect what people
think of you.”143 Users can pay to lock their “reputation profile” or to
improve their “reputation score.” 144 Another paid service offered by
MyLife allows users to compare their reputation scores. 145 MyLife’s
premium service, branded as “Public Record Remover,” reveals “other
136 INTELIUS, https://www.intelius.com [https://perma.cc/HD47-2NYW]; Get Instant
Public Records, INTELIUS, https://www.intelius.com/public-records [https://perma.cc
/5PSZ-658K].
137 Id.
138 Search Property Owners with Our Reverse Address Lookup, INTELIUS, https://www
.intelius.com/reverse-address-lookup/ [https://perma.cc/M897-2DLE].
139 Terms of Service, INTELIUS, (July 31, 2020) https://web.archive.org/web
/20200814135558/https://www.intelius.com/terms-of-use/.
140 Screenshot of MyLife search (Sept. 10, 2020) (on file with authors).
141 MYLIFE, https://web.archive.org/web/20200820195746/https://www.mylife.com.
142 Id.
143 See E-mail from MyLife to Reid Weisbord (Dec. 20, 2020) (on file with authors); see
also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Alleges California Purveyor of Background
Reports Misled Consumers to Think Its Reports on Individuals Might Contain Criminal and
Other Records (July 27, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020
/07/ftc-alleges-california-purveyor-background-reports-misled [https://perma.cc/YN5Q75V9].
144 MYLIFE, www.mylife.com [https://perma.cc/W6Z3-RX9Z].
145 Id.
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websites that are exposing your personal information online, putting
you at risk of identity theft. With a MyLife Premium Membership,
Public Record Remover helps make it possible to have your
information removed from these third party websites with a single
click.” 146 It is unclear, however, whether this premium service includes
removal of the member’s personal information from MyLife.com.
Notably, both Intelius and MyLife are privately held firms, so even
though the services that they provide rely on information collected
from the public record, the companies themselves are not required to
publicly disclose information about their own business operations. 147
Other competitors in this field include truthfinder.com,
peoplefinders.com, beenverified.com, and spokeo.com. All of these
firms include home address information drawn from public land
records in their searching services. 148
III.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This Part examines the policy implications of commodifying
public land records. We begin by considering the public interests
served by facilitating on-demand access to real property deeds on the
internet and commodifying the PII contained therein. We then
examine the role of privacy law in protecting personal information
extracted from public land records. For reasons explained below, we
conclude that the online disclosure of such information is virtually
unregulated under current law and extraordinarily challenging to
police even if lawmakers were willing to enact legal protections. We
conclude by outlining the voluntary precautions that individuals can
take to preserve the privacy of their residential addresses, and
examining a significant policy concern with increased anonymization
of property records: the potential use of real property as a vehicle for
money laundering.

146 Frequently Asked Questions, MYLIFE, https://www.mylife.com/help [https://perma
.cc/RV35-E8GV].
147 H.I.G. Capital Completes Acquisition of Intelius, supra note 133; MYLIFE, supra note 140;
Yuri Nagano, New State Law Pits Privacy Against Free Speech, Public Records and Data Brokers,
S.F. PUB. PRESS (July 1, 2019), https://sfpublicpress.org/news/2019-07/new-law-pitsprivacy-against-first-amendment-public-records-data-brokers
[https://perma.cc/M9E44QUD] (“Privately held MyLife, which is not subject to detailed public disclosures about its
business . . . .”).
148 Public Records Search, TRUTHFINDER, https://www.truthfinder.com/public-records
/ [https://perma.cc/8F8A-PHE8]; PEOPLEFINDERS, https://www.peoplefinders.com/
[https://perma.cc/7T99-S54P]; BEENVERIFIED, https://www.beenverified.com [https://
perma.cc/U776-3WE8]; SPOKEO, https://www.spokeo.com [https://perma.cc/2SH5P9G6].
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A. The Public Interest
As new commercial applications for big data continue to generate
robust demand for online public land records, real property data is
becoming a commodity traded in the booming market for personal
information. As a supplier of that commodity, county governments are
indeed benefitting financially from new sources of revenue. The
commodification of public land records has significantly benefited
county recording offices and the real estate buying public by financing
the digitization of land records. By improving the transparency of real
estate transactions, the digitization of public land records should
ultimately reduce errors and delays in the real estate settlement
process. 149 In particular, digitization has the potential to reduce the
cost of (and ultimately eliminate the need for) title insurance—
although the structure of the title insurance market may continue to
serve as a roadblock. 150
The Fidlar cases, however, raise questions about whether county
recording offices are obtaining a fair share of the economic spoils from
the commercialization of public land record data. Revenue sharing
arrangements between county governments and their vendors call for
a significant share of fees to be paid to the private vendor rather than
the public kitty. In part, fees paid to those vendors are undoubtedly
necessary to cover vendor costs and to provide a reasonable return on
vendor investment. And the vendors themselves are competing on the
market with title insurers who sell similar data culled from their own
digitized records. That market competition reduces the revenue
stream available to the counties’ vendors—and ultimately the share
paid to county governments. On top of that, private vendors have
sometimes been inadequately savvy, failing to properly structure their
subscriber agreements and online billing systems, allowing web
harvesters to avoid paying for a significant share of their search activity.
Taken together, these factors reduce the payouts available to county
governments.
The public benefits derived from sale of real property data—data
which is publicly available anyway—may justify the erosion of privacy
generated by commercialization of that data. But if government
149 Scholars have noted the benefits of increasing the transparency of public records
in other contexts. Lynn LoPucki, for instance, argues that online transparency of court
records tends to expose and reduce judicial corruption, enhance legislative control over
courts, popularize the law, and increase the predictability of litigation outcomes. Lynn M.
LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 494 (2009).
150 See Bruce M. Owen, Kickbacks, Specialization, Price Fixing, and Efficiency in Residential
Real Estate Markets, 29 STAN. L. REV. 931, 938–44 (1977) (describing how, even in 1977,
when the industry was less concentrated than it is today, title insurers enlisted government
regulation as a weapon in its effort to stifle the entry of new competitors).
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officials realize too little benefit, the sale of public land records for
commercial purposes unrelated to real estate transactions becomes
more difficult to justify. In addition, the monetization of data from
public land records is, in part, based on an assumption that title to
residential real property will continue to be recorded in the owner’s
name. Privacy precautions, such as the titling of residential real estate
in the name of an anonymous legal entity, is now fashionable in some
high-end markets, but it remains an uncommon practice for the vast
majority of homebuyers. As the wholesale disclosure of land records
data continues to gain steam, however, the commercialization of that
information may alter the recording preferences of homebuyers who
prefer to maintain the privacy of their home address. If anonymous
legal entity ownership becomes a widespread practice, then public
land records will be stripped of the information that data brokers prize
the most—PII that associates real property with the identity of the
homeowner. Thus, the economic value of public land records might
very well decline in the long run as individuals adapt to the hyper
commercialization of personal information.
B. Data Privacy
As we explained above, digitization of the deed recording system
propelled public land records from a state of relative obscurity to one
of hyper transparency in which real property deeds are interminably
exposed to purchasers of big data and the prying eyes of casual inquiry.
The burdens of performing a manual title search at city hall no longer
insulate property records from public access, and, indeed, purchasers
of big data have accelerated the dissemination of that information to
all corners of the internet. 151 In other contexts, courts have recognized
that “the compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain information alters
the privacy interest implicated by disclosure of that information.” 152
The relative inaccessibility of public records associated with significant
burdens of data collection has come to be known as “practical

151 Cf. Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
283, 301 (2003) (describing how “[d]igital technology is turning the asset of open
government into a privacy nightmare”).
152 U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764
(1989). In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the
Supreme Court held that FBI rap sheets maintained confidentially by the Department of
Justice for more than 24 million persons (at the time) were exempt from FOIA disclosure
to private third parties because the practical obscurity of individual police and court
records, although otherwise available to the public, rendered the disclosure of a federal
compilation of such information to be an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Id.
at 765.
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obscurity.”153 In the context of public land records, the digitization of
the deed recording system sounded the death knell for the practical
obscurity that had long prevailed during the era of manual title
examinations. Today, searchable access to public land records is no
more burdensome than a Google query.
Now unshackled from the confines of practical obscurity, when
real estate ownership information is published online, it becomes
nearly impossible to delete because it is almost always archived and
reproduced by internet bots, search engines, and other automated
electronic systems. 154 Thus, a homeowner who records title in her
name as an individual cannot prevent or revoke the online publication
of her name and home address. With no ability to dissociate herself
from the property online, she would have to physically relocate her
personal residence and, if purchasing her new home, record title
anonymously.
As a legal matter, the law does almost nothing to protect the
privacy of land records filed with the local deed recorder. The
relatively brief history of privacy law in the United States dates back to
1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published their
landmark article on The Right to Privacy, and state courts began to
recognize nascent privacy interests, including a cause of action for
invasion of privacy, under common-law doctrines of tort law. 155 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts, for example, explains that the tort of
privacy invasion applies to the publication of “a matter concerning the
private life of another . . . that would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and is not of legitimate concern to the public.” 156
But exactly which kinds of private matters, if published, would be
153 See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 21 (2013) (describing practical obscurity); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762.
154 One such internet archive, known as the Wayback Machine, “allows users to view
archived webpages and their content as they existed at any given point. The Internet
Archive uses, among its other tools, a WebCrawler to collect its data. A WebCrawler is an
internet bot, which systematically browses the World Wide Web, typically for the purpose of
web indexing. The data retrieved for the Internet Archive is stored on servers and indexed
to make that information searchable by the public using the Wayback Machine.” Tharpe
v. Lawidjaja, 8 F. Supp. 3d 743, 776 (W.D. Va. 2014). See also Tom Zeller, Jr., Keeper of Expired
Web Pages Is Sued Because Archive Was Used in Another Suit, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2005), https://
www.nytimes.com/2005/07/13/technology/keeper-of-expired-web-pages-is-sued-becausearchive-was-used-in.html [https://perma.cc/ZV7C-NAY8] (“The Internet Archive was
created in 1996 as the institutional memory of the online world, storing snapshots of everchanging Web sites and collecting other multimedia artifacts. . . . The Internet Archive uses
Web-crawling ‘bot’ programs to make copies of publicly accessible sites on a periodic,
automated basis.”).
155 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
156 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
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highly offensive to a reasonable person? Courts have generally held
that the publication of a person’s full name and street address does not
reveal “private” and “highly intimate or embarrassing facts about a
person’s private affairs, such that its publication would be highly
objectionable to a person of ordinary sensibilities.” 157 Under the
“public records defense,” courts have held that privacy interests do not
attach to the name and address of a property owner when that
information is already a matter of public record. 158 Other principles
constraining the right of privacy include the First Amendment, which
generally prohibits “sanctions on the publication of truthful
information of public concern,”159 and the “general [common-law]
right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including
judicial records and documents.” 160
Today, the modern doctrines of privacy law are broader than their
original common-law contours, but they still lack a coherent set of
unifying principles. As Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog describe,
“Privacy law in the United States has developed in a fragmented
fashion and is currently a hodgepodge of various constitutional
protections, federal and state statutes, torts, regulatory rules, and
treaties.” 161 Until the last few years, the collection of data for
157 Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 732 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Indus. Found. of the
S. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 683 (Tex. 1976)). See also Tobin v. Mich.
Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 331 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Mich. 1982) (“Names and addresses are not
ordinarily personal, intimate, or embarrassing pieces of information.”). Cf. Peter A. Winn,
Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an Age of Electronic
Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 311 (2004) (noting that “courts tend to protect personal
information when the purpose of access is not related to facilitating public scrutiny of the
judicial process, but to exploiting information in judicial records for commercial or other
purposes unrelated to public oversight of the judicial system”).
158 See Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717, 734 (Nev. 2017), rev’d
and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485,
203 L. Ed. 2d 768 (2019) (“One defense to invasion of privacy torts, referred to as the public
records defense, arises when a defendant can show that the disclosed information is
contained in a court’s official records. Such materials are public facts . . . and a defendant
cannot be liable for disclosing information about a plaintiff that was already public.”
(citation omitted) (citing Montesano v. Donrey Media Grp., 668 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Nev.
1983))); Near E. Side Cmty. Org. v. Hair, 555 N.E.2d 1324, 1335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Some
states, however, have enacted statutory privacy protections governing certain types of public
records. See Jordan v. Motor Vehicles Div., 781 P.2d 1203 (Or. 1989) (disclosure of vehicle
owner’s home address is exempt from open public records law).
159 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001).
160 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Matter of Cont’l Ill.
Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the policy of allowing access
to public records “relate[s] to the public’s right to monitor the functioning of our courts,
thereby insuring quality, honesty and respect for our legal system”).
161 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014).
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commercial purposes, both online and offline, remained almost
entirely unregulated by either federal or state law. 162 On occasion, the
Federal Trade Commission stepped in to police violations of a
corporation’s consumer data privacy policy that rose to the level of a
deceptive or unfair trade practice, but that proved to be the limit of
federal regulatory intervention. 163 Instead, the commercial collection
of personal information has been largely governed by private
agreement and contractual terms of service, which offered little
protection against unauthorized disclosure. 164
Over the last few years, public support favoring more stringent
privacy protections attracted the attention of lawmakers, with state
legislatures taking the lead. In the first wave of data privacy legislation,
states enacted statutory requirements that sought to enhance data
security protections with respect to PII. Those statutes applied to
individuals and businesses that maintain personal information
belonging to third parties and generally required the implementation
of reasonable precautions to prevent unauthorized disclosure or
acquisition. 165 But, in a nod to the tort law public records defense,
those laws expressly excluded from statutory protection personal
information acquired from publicly available government records. 166
Thus, the first wave of reforms did not establish any privacy rights with
respect to information extracted from public land records.
The next wave of privacy legislation targeted the commercial use
of personal information by data brokers who collect PII for the
purpose of selling or profiting from it. At the federal level, the
proposed Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2018
would have granted consumers the right to opt out of data collection
by commercial data brokers, but the bill failed to pass in Congress. 167
162 See id. at 594.
163 See id. at 599.
164 See id. See also Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97 WASH. U.L. REV.
773, 777 (2020) (describing how the implementation of privacy protections by technology
professions has become increasingly ineffective).
165 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-100 (2020) (“Any person who conducts business in
this State and owns, licenses, or maintains personal information shall implement and
maintain reasonable procedures and practices to prevent the unauthorized acquisition, use,
modification, disclosure, or destruction of personal information collected or maintained in
the regular course of business.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
50-7a02 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-2 (2020).
166 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-101(7)(b) (2020) (“‘Personal information’ does
not include publicly available information that is lawfully made available to the general
public from federal, state, or local government records or widely-distributed media.”);
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.005(2)(b) (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a01(g)(3) (2020);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-1 (2020).
167 Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2018, H.R. 6548, 115th Cong.,
§ 5(e)(2) (2018).
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In contrast, efforts to regulate the data brokerage industry have gained
more traction at the state level. In 2018, for instance, Vermont became
the first state to enact a data broker consumer protection law, which,
among other provisions, requires data brokers to register with the state
annually and imposes a statutory duty to protect PII against
unauthorized disclosure. 168 Like other data privacy laws, the Vermont
legislation expressly exempts personal information obtained from
publicly available government sources such as public land records. 169
Later that year, California enacted the Consumer Privacy Act of
2018, a sweeping piece of legislation that, for the first time, granted
consumers the right to know which businesses collect their personal
information, what information those business have collected, and
whether their information has been sold or disclosed. 170 The
California statute also gave consumers the right to prevent the sale of
personal information by certain large businesses that “[derive] 50
percent or more of [their] annual revenues from selling consumers’
personal information.”171 As originally enacted, the California
Consumer Privacy Act defined personal information to include data
drawn from publicly available sources when used for a purpose “not
compatible with the purpose for which the data is maintained and
made available in the government records or for which it is publicly
maintained.” 172 The plain language of that definition would have
applied to personal information collected from public land records
and prohibited the use of that information for commercial purposes
unrelated to a real estate transaction.
Before the law went into effect, however, strong opposition from
the business community pressured the legislature to repeal the socalled compatibility exception for information obtained from public
sources. 173 Opponents, almost all of whom were industry stakeholders,

168 See An Act Relating to Data Brokers and Consumer Protection, No. 171, 2018 Vt.
Acts & Resolves 584 (codified as VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2430, 2446–47, 2480b, 2480h
(2020)); Katherine E. Armstrong, Vermont First State to Pass Data Broker Law, NAT’L L. REV.
(June 4, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/vermont-first-state-to-pass-databroker-law [https://perma.cc/6HAP-HTGU].
169 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2430(10)(B) (2020) (“‘Personally identifiable information’
does not mean publicly available information that is lawfully made available to the general
public from federal, State, or local government records.”).
170 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, 1798.105, 1798.110 (West 2020).
171 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.120, 1798.140(c)(1)(C) (West 2020).
172 Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1)(K)(2) (2018) with Assemb. B. 375, 2017–
2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
173 See Memorandum from Mayer Brown LLP on Behalf of the Software & Info. Indus.
Ass’n to the Cal. Gen. Assemb. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://web.archive.org/web
/20201027040106/http://www.siia.net/Portals/0/pdf/Policy/Data%20Driven
%20Innovation/Memo%20re%20CCPA.pdf?ver=2019-01-25-163504-003.
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claimed that the regulation violated constitutional speech protections
and was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to enumerate the
many purposes for which the government maintains public records. 174
In 2019, just before the statute’s effective date, the legislature relented
by removing the compatibility exception and amending the statute to
expressly exclude publicly available government records from the
scope of statutory protection. 175 Following California’s lead, other
states recently introduced information privacy bills regulating the
commercial data brokerage industry, but, like California, those bills
expressly exempt information collected from publicly available
government records. 176 Thus, despite growing public demand for data
privacy, to date, neither Congress nor any state legislature has imposed
statutory privacy protections that restrict the commercial use of
personal information extracted from public land records, thereby
leaving wholly unregulated one of the primary sources of information
exploited by the booming big data industry.
Europe, by contrast, has been more aggressive in protecting
consumers against commercialization of personal data. Operating
outside the constraints of the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment, 177
the European Parliament, in 1995, issued a directive recognizing the
right of “data subject[s]” to obtain “erasure or blocking” of data when
processing of data about the subject does not comply with the
directive’s provisions. 178 In the leading case construing that directive,
the European Court of Justice required Google Spain to remove search
results that would lead an internet user entering the complainant’s
name to a sixteen-year-old newspaper announcement indicating—
accurately—that the complainant had been involved with attachment
proceedings for the recovery of debts. 179 In holding that the
complainant had a right to removal of the links to the article, the court

174 See, e.g., id.
175 Assemb. B. 874, 2018–2019 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); CAL. CIV. CODE §
1798.140(o)(1)(K)(2) (2020) (“‘Personal information’ does not include publicly available
information. For purposes of this paragraph, ‘publicly available’ means information that is
lawfully made available from federal, state, or local government records.”).
176 See 2019 S.B. 418, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2019) (“‘Identifying information’
does not include publicly available information that is lawfully made available to the general
public from federal, state, or local government records.”); S.B. 957, 2020 Leg., 441st Sess.
(Md. 2020); S.B. 120, 191st Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019); S.B. 2548, 2020 Leg., 135th
Sess. (Miss. 2020).
177 For an argument that the First Amendment protects search engine results, see
Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search
Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883 (2012).
178 Council Directive 95/46, art. 14, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 32 (EC).
179 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 98 (May 13, 2014).
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focused on the absence of a significant public interest in access to the
information. 180
Europe has gradually expanded its “right to be forgotten,”
culminating in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
which became effective in 2018. 181 That regulation makes it unlawful
to “process” personal data unless the processing falls into statutorily
defined categories. 182 Marketing is not one of those categories; the
regulation imposes on data controllers the obligation to erase personal
data—on request of the data subject—whenever the data are processed
for direct marketing purposes. 183 Moreover, the right to be forgotten
is no longer limited to Europe; other countries have embraced
variations of the right in ways that would curtail commercial use of
personal data. 184
Efforts in the United States have been far more limited, and have
generally targeted those most vulnerable to misuse of PII. In
Minnesota, victims of domestic violence or sexual assault who provide
county recorders with statutory notice may prevent those recorders
from disclosing real property records. 185 If a party needs that
information for bona fide title examination purposes, the party must
apply to the Secretary of State, who is authorized to “respond by an
affirmation in writing that the property subject to the title examination
is or is not the property subject to a program participant’s real property
notice.” 186
180 Id.
181 Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, art. 17 [hereinafter GDPR]. For
discussion of the expansion of the right, see generally Dawn Carla Nunziato, The Fourth Year
of Forgetting: The Troubling Expansion of the Right to be Forgotten, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1011
(2018).
182 GDPR, supra note 181, art. 6. The GDPR defines “processing” as “any operation or
set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether
or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring,
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission,
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction,
erasure or destruction.” Id. art. 4(2).
183 Id. art. 21(2) (giving data subject the right to object to data processed for direct
marketing purposes); id. art. 17(1)(c) (giving the data subject the right to obtain the
erasure of data subjection to objection in article 21(2)).
184 See Nunziato, supra note 181, at 1059–63 (discussing restrictions in Japan, Mexico,
Colombia, Russia, and India).
185 MINN. STAT. § 13.045(4a) (2020) prohibits county recorders from disclosing
identity data of “program participant[s].” Program participants are defined to include
“victim[s] of domestic violence, sexual assault, or harassment or stalking.” MINN. STAT. §
5B.03(1)(2) (2020).
186 MINN. STAT. § 13.045(4b) (2020). For more extensive discussion of the Minnesota
provision, see Jonathan Grant, Note, Address Confidentiality and Real Property Records:
Safeguarding Interests in Land While Protecting Battered Women, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2577, 2588–
89 (2016).
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Other states protect the privacy of law enforcement personnel but
expressly permit disclosure of residential property information for the
legitimate purpose of title examination. Idaho, for example, prohibits
the disclosure of home address information for law enforcement
officers who apply for this privacy protection, 187 but that information
is not shielded from disclosure “[i]f requested by a financial institution
or title company for business purposes.”188 Arizona permits a broader
range of citizens to limit access to PII in the county land records. The
Arizona statute protects public officials whose actions might raise the
ire of disappointed citizens, and also persons protected under an order
of protection or an injunction against harassment. 189 The Arizona
statute, however, requires the applicant to file an affidavit with a judge
asserting why she believes that life or safety is in danger and why
restricting access will reduce the danger. 190 And, as in Idaho, the
statute does not prohibit access by title insurers. 191 Still other states
provide statutory protection for PII of public officials without explicitly
targeting land records.
Florida, for instance provides similar
protection for judges, public defenders, tax collectors, and a variety of
public investigators. 192
Most recently, in New Jersey, where lawmakers were horrified by
the violent attack against Judge Salas and her family, the legislature
enacted a narrowly tailored privacy statute that requires government
agencies to redact the home address information of state and federal
judges from government records available for public inspection and
prohibits the publication of that information online. 193 In announcing
the signing of “Daniel’s Law,” named for Judge Salas’s slain son, the
New Jersey Governor’s Office summarized the statute as “amend[ing]
the Open Public Records Act . . . to exclude from the definition of a
government (i.e., public) record the portion of any document which
discloses the home address of any active or retired 1) judge, 2)
prosecutor or 3) law enforcement officer.”194 Thus, Daniel’s Law, like
187 IDAHO CODE § 19-5803 (2021).
188 IDAHO CODE § 19-5802(3) (2021).
189 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 11-483(O)(4) (2021) (defining eligible persons); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN § 11-483(A) (2021) (authorizing request that public be denied access).
190 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 11-483(B)(4) (2021).
191 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 11-483(M) (2021).
192 FLA. STAT. § 119.071(4)(d)(3) (2021) requires custodians of address information
to maintain exempt status upon written request from a party protected under one of the
many categories listed in § 119.071(4)(d)(2).
193 See Assemb. B. 1649, 219th Leg., 2020 Sess. (N.J. 2020).
194 Governor Murphy Signs “Daniel’s Law,” STATE OF N.J.: GOVERNOR PHIL MURPHY (Nov.
20, 2020), https://nj.gov/governor/news/news/562020/approved/20201120b.shtml
[https://perma.cc/CV29-C3V5]. In 2015, the New Jersey legislature enacted a statute
prohibiting “[a] State or local governmental agency [from] knowingly post[ing] or
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the statutes in Idaho and Florida, does not specifically regulate the
recording of real property deeds, but rather, the manner by which
government records in general are subject to public disclosure.
Daniel’s Law also prohibits “[a] person, business, or association [from]
disclos[ing] on the Internet, or re-disclos[ing] or otherwise mak[ing]
available, the home address or unpublished home telephone number
of” a judge “under circumstances in which a reasonable person would
believe that providing that information would expose another to
harassment or risk of harm to life or property.” 195 The legislation
includes a process through which judges may request the removal of
home address information from the internet and provides civil
remedies that may be imposed upon private actors who fail to comply
with a removal request. 196
Without question, legislation in all of these states represents an
earnest attempt to protect the privacy and personal safety of persons
who, by reason of their positions, are likely to interact with risky or
dangerous segments of the population. But it is unclear whether the
recently enacted privacy protections would, in fact, meaningfully
enhance the personal safety of those persons. For example, would the
New Jersey bill actually prevent a local deed recorder from disclosing
online a publicly recorded deed to a house owned in the individual
name of a judge? Like the statutes in other states, the bill does not
require the state to maintain a central database of government officials
protected under Daniel’s Law, so unless a judge affirmatively notifies
the relevant custodian, how would the deed recorder know whether
any given homeowner happens to be a judge? If a deed to a personal
residence owned by a judge was previously digitized and warehoused
electronically on the internet before the statute went into effect, would
the deed recorder be obligated to locate and remove the deed from its
online database? Even if the recording office succeeds in removing a
digitized deed from the government’s online database, a title company
may have already incorporated the information into its private title
plant. Would the title company reasonably be expected to know who
is entitled to protection under the statute and, if so, what obligations
would it have concerning the protected person’s property records? 197

publish[ing] on the Internet the home address or unpublished home telephone number
of any retired law enforcement officer or law enforcement officer without first obtaining
the written permission of that law enforcement officer or retired law enforcement officer.”
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1-17 (West 2020). Assembly Bill 1649 extends that protection to state
and federal judges. See N.J. Assemb. B. 1649.
195 N.J. Assemb. B. 1649.
196 Id.
197 See Roscoe & Szypszak, supra note 15, at 376–77 (noting that many public recording
documents are duplicated in private title plants). Relatedly, other researchers have
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Would data brokers be liable under the reasonable person standard
for publishing home address information in the absence of actual
notice that certain PII belongs to a judge protected by the statute?
What would happen if a foreign data broker located outside the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts failed to respond to a judicial request to
remove PII from the internet notwithstanding the domestic civil
remedies that could be imposed for lack of compliance?
However well-intended, we predict that reforms restricting the
disclosure and online dissemination of PII extracted from public land
records will prove difficult to implement whenever homeowners
record title to a personal residence in their own name. Daniel’s Law
represents a commendable effort to secure the privacy of PII, but
legislators should devote further consideration to the inevitable
tension between privacy of homeownership and the notice-giving
functions of the deed recording system. Minnesota, for example, has
attempted to balance those interests, but its solution—designating the
Secretary of State as the gatekeeper for public disclosure—is probably
not scalable beyond the limited class of domestic violence survivors
protected by the statute. 198 Likewise, lawmakers should consider
whether ordinary homeowners who do not want information about
their personal residence produced online should be subject to the
same stringent public disclosure rules as government officials and
harassment victims currently protected by statute. 199
We also
encourage further debate about the tradeoffs of partially anonymized
deeds, which could impair the ability of legitimate information seekers
to ascertain the quality of title and undermine the recording system’s
capacity to deter title fraud. 200
At the federal level, Senators Robert Menendez, Cory Booker, and
Lindsey Graham recently proposed a complementary bill “[t]o provide
for judicial security and privacy” that, if enacted, would be titled the
“Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2020” (the “Anderl
suggested that local deed recorders could enhance the privacy of residential address
information by disabling the search-by-name function on their electronic public records
platforms. Manya Sleeper, Divya Sharma & Lorrie Faith Cranor, I Know Where You Live:
Analyzing Privacy Protection in Public Databases, PROC. 10TH ANN. ACM WORKSHOP PRIV.
ELEC. SOC’Y 165, 165 (2011), https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports
/CMUCyLab11015.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZY7-X6VH]. But disabling name searchability
on the deed recorder’s platform would not protect digitized public land records maintained
by private title plants because data brokers who purchase those records could render them
searchable by name.
198 Roscoe & Szypszak, supra note 15, at 380 (noting administrative burden of
expanding privacy protections).
199 Id. (noting fairness concerns).
200 See id. at 384 (noting importance of complete records in the title examination
process).
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Act”). 201 Endorsed by Judge Salas, 202 the Anderl Act provides special
protections for judges’ PII, which is defined to include the judge’s
home address, telephone number, email address, social security and
driver’s license numbers, bank account information, property
ownership and tax records, birth and marriage records, vehicle
registration information, and information pertaining to members of a
judge’s family. 203 A judge would have the right to request that federal
agencies remove PII from public display. 204 However, because federal
agencies are not primarily responsible for the disclosure of public
records containing PII, the bill also authorizes the Attorney General to
award grants to state and local government agencies which request
funds for database upgrades that would facilitate the redaction or
removal of a judge’s PII from public display. 205 With respect to private
conduct, the bill would declare it “unlawful for a data broker to sell,
license, trade, purchase, or otherwise provide or make available for
consideration judges’ personally identifiable information.”206 As in
New Jersey, the federal bill provides that, “[a]fter a person, business,
or association has received a written request from an at-risk individual
to protect the judges’ personally identifiable information, that person,
business, or association shall have 72 hours to remove the judges’
personally identifiable information from the internet,” a requirement
that a judge would be authorized to enforce by private right of
action. 207 The bill would also appropriate funds to the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts and the Marshals Service to establish
a new threat management capability that would, among other
intelligence functions, monitor the internet for the publication of
PII. 208
Like the state legislation, the intent behind the proposed Anderl
Act is nothing but good and directs necessary attention to a problem
that has otherwise been overlooked by policymakers. Commendably,
the bill attempts to respond directly and pointedly to the horrendous
201 Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2020, S. 4711, 116th Cong.
(2020).
202 Esther Salas, My Son Was Killed Because I’m a Federal Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/08/opinion/esther-salas-murder-federal-judges.html
[https://perma.cc/8HC5-Q8JD].
203 Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act of 2020, S. 4711 § 3(7), 116th Cong.
(2020).
204 Id. at § 4(a).
205 Id. at § 4(b).
206 Id. at § 4(c)(1)(A).
207 Id. at §§ 4(c)–(d). The bill also provides funding for judges to install a home
intrusion detection system at their personal residence and training for judges on how to
protect their information and personal safety. Id. at §§ 5–6.
208 Id. at § 7.
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tragedy that befell Judge Salas and her family. But again, the Anderl
Act is not likely to prevent the online circulation of PII extracted from
public land records. 209 The federal plan relies on county governments
to request grants to pay for modification of their electronic database
management systems. But counties are not obligated to seek a grant,
and any county that does receive a grant would be required to
undertake the challenging work of upgrading its systems and
preparing official reports summarizing its implementation of
protocols to secure judicial PII. Some county governments may choose
to participate, but we predict that most will not. 210 Lastly, like the state
legislation, since the stated purpose of the Anderl Act is to enhance
security and privacy for federal judges, it does not address the privacy
of PII for ordinary homebuyers concerned about the commodification
of information recited on their real property filings.
C. The Move Toward Anonymously Owned Land: Privacy and Pitfalls
Web harvesters can obtain personal information from real
property records only when those records include personal
information. If a buyer purchases property not in her own name, but
in the name of a legal entity—a corporation, and LLC, or a trust—the
buyer can obtain a modicum of privacy protection. Perhaps in part for
that reason, the last several decades have seen an increase in entity
ownership of real property. That increase, however, has presented
challenges for regulators because some buyers have used entity
ownership—particularly ownership by anonymous shell companies—
as a vehicle to launder money. This section begins by exploring the
methods by which a buyer can ensure anonymity, and then discusses
the money laundering problem anonymity has helped generate,
together with the implementation of new regulations designed to
monitor money laundering in the real estate market.

209 We recently noted some of our concerns in the New Jersey Law Journal. Charles
Toutant, After Tragedies, Bills Aim to Hide Judges’ Home Address. But Is That Even Possible in
Internet Age?, N.J. L.J. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document
/X96IAQ60000000?jcsearch=gmm45ideej#jcite [https://perma.cc/CJ3A-QP5G].
210 In counties that do participate and successfully implement new systems to remove
judicial PII from public display, judges would then face the daunting task (though aided by
the Marshals Service) of locating all previously published references and demanding
removal. Assuming a judge is able to ascertain contact information for each person or
company responsible for publishing her PII, many offending data brokers may still fail to
respond or comply while others may be located outside the United States and beyond the
jurisdictional reach of its courts. A private action asserted against a party who fails to appear
and cannot be located is unlikely to yield collectable damages or removal of judicial PII
from the internet.
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1. Anonymous Title: Voluntary Precautions
Prospective homeowners seeking to prevent the online
publication of personal information can erect a veil of privacy by
anonymizing their deed before recording title to property. Because
everything published on the internet is automatically archived, 211 title
anonymity cannot provide meaningful protection for existing
homeowners who have already recorded title in their own name if the
deed has already appeared online.
A privacy precaution popular among homebuyers in the high-end
residential real estate market is the acquisition of property in the name
of an anonymous limited liability company established for the purpose
of holding title to the personal residence. The name of the LLC bearing an anonymous moniker appears on the deed rather than the
homeowner’s actual name. The beneficial owner’s identity is then
recited on corporate documents that are not filed on the public
record. Anonymous LLCs appeal to ultra-wealthy homeowners who
have the financial capacity to purchase property in cash, but they are
not feasible for homebuyers who require a traditional mortgage
because banks do not typically underwrite conventional, owneroccupied residential mortgages for property titled in the name of a
limited liability entity.212
To avoid leaving an online footprint that publicly associates their
name and home address, homebuyers who require a mortgage can
record title using a revocable trust. 213 As the name implies, revocable
trusts are donative instruments that may be unilaterally revoked or
amended by the settlor. 214 So long as the trust remains revocable, the

211 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
212 See Ilyce Glink & Samuel J. Tamkin, Owning Real Estate Under an LLC Has
Advantages, but It Can Be Costly, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/03/11/owning-real-estate-under-an-llc-hasadvantages-it-can-be-costly [https://perma.cc/964R-HCS9] (“[T]he biggest issue you
might have with an LLC is that lenders will consider your real estate ownership as an
investment property. Once you fall into the investment-property bucket, the lending rules
change and get more expensive. A person, a couple or a group of individuals who own a
home, two-flat or even a four-flat building in their own name have the ability to obtain
financing from the residential lending side of a particular lender. Once you have an LLC,
the lender will send you to the commercial lending side of the bank.”).
213 Some jurisdictions, such as Illinois and Massachusetts, recognize specialized types
of land trusts that facilitate this form of anonymous ownership by a third-party trustee. See
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 420/3 (2020) (setting forth recordation procedures under the Illinois
Land Trust statute); Guilfoil v. Sec’y of Exec. Off. Health & Human Servs., 162 N.E.3d 627,
632 (Mass. 2021) (describing elements of the Massachusetts nominee trust).
214 See UNIF. TR. CODE § 602(a) (“Unless the terms of a trust expressly provide that the
trust is irrevocable, the settlor may revoke or amend the trust.”).

WEISBORD_STERK_03_23.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

3/23/2022 3:48 PM

THE COMMODIFICATION OF PUBLIC LAND RECORDS

551

settlor is treated as the functional owner of the trust corpus. 215 A
revocable trust, therefore, can be drafted to replicate all of the features
of homeownership for the duration of the settlor’s lifetime. To do so,
the settlor could appoint herself as trustee and beneficiary for life;
then, upon the settlor’s death, the trust should provide for the
distribution of trust property to remainder beneficiaries. Under this
structure, a revocable trust must name at least one beneficiary aside
from the settlor because “[a] trust is created only if . . . the same
person is not the sole trustee and sole beneficiary.” 216 But again, the
third-party beneficiaries need not be entitled to any trust property
until after the settlor’s death, so the settlor would retain full ownership
and control during her own lifetime.
Banks are typically willing to underwrite residential mortgages for
property titled in trust if the trust instrument meets several technical
requirements. 217 First, the trust must be established by a settlor who is
a living individual, and it must become effective during the settlor’s
lifetime. 218 Second, the trust must provide that the settlor reserves the
right to revoke the trust during her lifetime. 219 Third, at least one
person must be a settlor, trustee, and beneficiary of the trust. 220
Fourth, at least one of the trustees must be a borrower. 221 Fifth, the
trust must empower the trustees to mortgage the property for the
purpose of securing a loan. 222 Sixth, the trust must identify the
beneficiaries. 223 Seventh, the trust does not impair the lender’s
rights. 224 Eighth, the title insurance policy assures full protection to
the trust and, without listing any exceptions arising from the trust’s
ownership of the property, states that title to the property is vested in
the trustees. 225 Some lenders may impose even more stringent
requirements for recording title in the name of a trustee. However,
banks that simplify or liberalize the underwriting of mortgages for

215 See UNIF. TR. CODE § 603(b) (“To the extent a trust is revocable [and the settlor has
capacity to revoke the trust], rights of the beneficiaries are subject to the control of, and
the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to, the settlor.”).
216 See UNIF. TR. CODE § 402(a)(5).
217 See TD BANK, TRUST REVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE (2018) (on file with authors); CMG
FIN., TRUST REVIEW CHECKLIST (n.d.), http://docs.cmgfi.com/forms/corr-trust-reviewchecklist.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DA4-T7ZZ].
218 See CMG FIN., supra note 217.
219 See id.
220 See id.
221 See id.
222 See id.
223 See id.
224 See id.
225 See id.
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anonymously titled owner-occupied residential property may find that
borrowers are willing to pay a premium for privacy.
Titling on the deed should reflect ownership of the property in
the name of the trustees. Thus, to anonymize the beneficial owner’s
identity, the trust’s moniker should not include the name of or
otherwise identify the settlor. For example, a revocable trust established by Mary Poppins to acquire title to her new home located at 123
Cherry Tree Lane might be titled the “123 Cherry Tree Lane
Revocable Trust,” not the “Mary Poppins Revocable Trust.” The
settlor should also appoint at least one third-party trustee whose name
will appear nonanonymously on the deed. Unless prohibited by the
bank, the third-party trustee should be identified on the deed without
reciting the name of the settlor/trustee. Thus, in the example above,
Mary Poppins might appoint herself and her friend Bert as co-trustees.
The deed would then be titled in the name of “Bert, as Trustee of the
123 Cherry Tree Lane Revocable Trust.” The mortgage must be
recorded with the deed, 226 so, again, unless prohibited by the bank, the
mortgage should be signed in the name of the third-party trustee and
not the settlor. While the settlor must be identified on and sign the
promissory note, 227 the note is not typically recorded with the
mortgage. 228
2. Entity Ownership and Money Laundering Regulations
The commodification of public land records is driving demand
for anonymous entity ownership at a time when the federal
government, after years of inaction, has redoubled its efforts to
regulate entity-owned real estate with a heavier hand. While entity
ownership of real estate can facilitate legitimate privacy objectives, it
also increases the attractiveness of real estate as a device for money
laundering. After all, anonymous entity ownership of any asset has the
potential to facilitate money laundering. If a person suspected of
criminal activity opens a bank or brokerage account, or buys property,
in his own name, government investigators have a reasonable
226 A mortgage must be recorded with the deed because it is of no effect against
subsequent bona fide purchasers and mortgagees without notice unless it is first recorded.
See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:26A-12(c) (West).
227 See, e.g., CMG FIN., supra note 217; CMG FIN., LOAN PURCHASE PROGRAM SELLER’S
GUIDE 33 (2020).
228 See Brandrup v. ReconTrust Co., 303 P.3d 301, 316 (Or. 2013) (“Because a
promissory note generally contains no description of real property and does not transfer,
encumber, or otherwise affect the title to real property, it cannot be recorded in land title
records.”); John Patrick Hunt, Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, Rebalancing Public and
Private in the Law of Mortgage Transfer, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1529, 1547 (2013) (“The realproperty recording statutes do not apply to promissory notes.”).
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opportunity to discover the asset and to tie it to the underlying crime.
But if the same person (or network of people) forms a corporation, an
LLC, a trust, or another entity, and opens the account or buys the
property in the name of the entity, investigators face increased
difficulty in tying the funds or the property to the criminal activity. 229
In enacting the Corporate Transparency Act of 2020, 230 as we will
explain in greater detail below, Congress attempted to ease the burden
on investigators by requiring disclosure of beneficial ownership
information by entities previously exempt from reporting
requirements. The Act is the latest, and perhaps most significant, in a
series of federal government steps designed to combat money
laundering. The statute also has the potential to reduce anonymous
ownership of real estate, but whether the statute ultimately has that
effect remains to be seen.
Long before its most recent enactment, Congress made it
substantially more difficult to launder money through financial
institutions by effectively commandeering those institutions as agents
of law enforcement. Pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, the
Secretary of the Treasury requires financial institutions to provide
currency transaction reports for payments, receipts, and transfers of
currency in amounts greater than $10,000. 231 Additionally, since 1992,
Congress has required banks to file suspicious activity reports with the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the
Treasury Department. 232 Every financial institution must establish an
229 As Jennifer Shasky Calvery, a former director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network put it before a Congressional committee, “[b]eing able to identify who the real
people are that are involved in a transaction is critical to our work to combat money
laundering and terrorism, enforce sanctions, and stop other illicit abuses of the U.S.
financial system.” She emphasized that “shell companies can . . . be used to conceal the
source, ownership, and control of illegal proceeds by concealing the identity of the natural
people who control the entity.” See Eric Naing, FinCEN Head Touts Efforts to Expose Owners
of Shell Companies, CQ ROLL CALL WASH. BANKING BRIEFING, May 27, 2016, 2016 WL
3025431.
230 Corporate Transparency Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-283, §§ 6401–03; 134 Stat.
3421, 4604–4624 (2020).
231 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.310–.311 (2019).
232 The bank must report a transaction in an amount greater than $5000 when it
suspects or has reason to suspect that the transaction “involves funds derived from illegal
activities or is intended or conducted in order to hide or disguise funds or assets derived
from illegal activities” or “has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in
which the particular customer would normally be expected to engage, and the institution
knows of no reasonable explanation for the transaction . . . .”
12 C.F.R.
§ 21.11(c)(4)(2019). Both the bank and the government must keep suspicious activity
reports confidential. 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(k)(2019).
After enactment of the Patriot Act, regulations extended the obligation to file SARs
to other financial institutions, including casinos, securities brokers and dealers, mutual
funds, and insurance companies. 31 C.F.R. §§ 1021.320, 1023.320, 1024.320, 1025.320.
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anti-money-laundering program that, among other requirements,
designates a compliance officer and establishes an employee training
program. 233
Since 2018, FinCEN’s “customer due diligence” regulations have
required financial institutions to identify beneficial owners of entity
clients. The regulations define beneficial owners to include any
owners of 25% or more of the equity interest in the entity and also
include a single individual with significant responsibility to manage or
control the entity. 234 Banks, securities brokers and dealers, and financial institutions must conduct ongoing monitoring to update customer
information, including beneficial ownership of equity interests in
entity customers. 235
The stringent regulation of financial institutions led some
criminal enterprises to consider alternative vehicles for money
laundering. 236 Real estate—particularly high-end real estate—has
provided opportunities to launder large sums derived from criminal
activity. 237 For foreign investors in particular, the use of real estate in
the United States to launder ill-gotten gains from crimes committed
abroad has offered not only the anonymity of entity ownership, but

233

31 U.S.C. § 5318(h).
Criminal and civil penalties serve as the primary enforcement mechanisms for
violation of financial institutions’ violation of anti-money-laundering obligations. Willful
violations of the statutes or regulations carry a criminal penalty of $250,000. 31 U.S.C.
§ 5322(a). When the violation is failure to maintain an adequate compliance program, “a
separate violation occurs for each day the violation continues and at each office, branch, or
place of business at which a violation occurs or continues.” 31 U.S.C. §5322(c). In addition,
a financial institution that violates a regulation with respect to a transaction is liable for a
civil penalty in an amount equal to the amount of the transaction. 31 U.S.C. §5321(a)(2).
The government has brought criminal proceedings against a number of banks for
violations of anti-money laundering regulations. These prosecutions appear to result in
deferred prosecution in return for an acknowledgment by the bank of insufficiency of its
compliance efforts, together with a cash payment, most of which is designated a
“forfeiture.” See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New
York, Manhattan U.S. Att’y Announces Crim. Charges Against U.S. Bancorp for Violations
of the Bank Secrecy Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr
/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-criminal-charges-against-us-bancorp-violations-bank
[https://perma.cc/M8AQ-8L8D] (discussion of settlement with U.S. Bancorp structured as
a $75 million penalty and a $453 million civil forfeiture).
234 31 C.F.R. § 1010.230(d).
235 31 C.F.R. § 1020.210(b)(5). In addition, the Patriot Act’s “know your customer”
law requires financial institutions to verify the identity of their accountholders upon the
opening of a financial account. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l)(l)–(2).
236 For a discussion of art as a vehicle for money laundering, see Alessandra
Dagirmanjian, Note, Laundering the Art Market: A Proposal for Regulating Money Laundering
Through Art in the United States, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 687 (2019).
237 See Jeffrey R. Boles, Million Dollar Ghost Buildings: Dirty Money Flowing Through
Luxury Real Estate Markets, 45 REAL EST. L. J. 476 (2017).
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also the relative stability of U.S. law as a protection against attachment
by a foreign government. 238 Thus, while money laundering has not
been the only reason for holding real estate in the name of an
anonymous entity, FinCEN investigators became suspicious when they
observed certain geographic markets known to be especially attractive
to foreign buyers, such as New York and Miami, with an unusually high
incidence of entity ownership. In 2015, for instance, 43% of the dollar
volume of real estate purchases in Manhattan, and more than 33% in
Miami-Dade County, were taken in corporate name. 239 By contrast,
even in Los Angeles County, which had the highest total dollar volume
of corporate purchasers, the percentage was 16%—just under half the
percentage in Miami. 240
Until 2016, the real estate industry was largely immune from antimoney laundering regulation. Although the Patriot Act required all
financial institutions, including persons involved in real estate
settlements and closings, to establish an anti-money-laundering
program, 241 FinCEN temporarily exempted certain financial
institutions, including persons involved in real estate closings and
settlements, from the requirement to establish an anti-moneylaundering program. 242 The exemption’s stated purpose was to enable
regulators “to study the affected industries and to consider the extent
to which anti-money laundering program requirements should be
applied to them, taking into account the specific characteristics of the
various entities defined as ‘financial institutions’ by the BSA.” 243
Because banks and other lending institutions were already subject to
anti-money-laundering regulations, the exemption effectively
insulated only those transactions made without the aid of a financial
institution—that is, all cash transactions.
In January 2016, FinCEN issued its first Geographic Targeting
Order (GTO) directed at all-cash real estate transactions. Not
surprisingly, the initial order was limited to high-value transactions in
238 See id. at 489–90.
239 C. Sean Hundtofte & Ville Rantala, Anonymous Capital Flows and U.S. Housing
Markets, 31 tbl.3 (U. Miami Bus. Sch. Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 18-3, 2018), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3186634.
240 Id.
241 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1) (“In order to guard against money laundering through
financial institutions, each financial institution shall establish anti-money laundering
programs, including, at a minimum (A) the development of internal policies, procedures,
and controls; (B) the designation of a compliance officer; (C) an ongoing employee
training program; and (D) an independent audit function to test programs.”).
242 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Program
Requirements for “Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and Settlements,” 68 Fed. Reg.
17569–71 (proposed Apr. 10, 2003) (codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 103).
243 Id.
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Manhattan and Miami-Dade County, where the incidence of
ownership by shell companies was particularly high. 244 The order
applied to “transactions of $3 million or more in Manhattan and $1
million or more in Miami-Dade [County].” 245 The order imposed new
obligations on title insurance companies, presumably on the theory
that few money launderers would choose to forego title protection on
expensive real estate purchases. Pursuant to the order, title insurers
must identify all individuals who own, directly or indirectly, 25% of an
entity that acquired covered property, and must obtain and record
identifying documentation (a passport or driver’s license) on each
such individual. 246
Although the initial GTO was to last for 180 days, 247 FinCEN
subsequently extended the order, expanded its coverage to additional
geographical areas, and reduced the threshold transaction amount to
$300,000 in each of the covered areas. 248 In addition to identifying
beneficial owners of entity purchasers, the title insurer must file a
currency transaction report on each covered transaction, and must
keep all records for five years. 249 The title insurer is also responsible
for compliance by its employees and for transmitting the order to its
agents. 250 Finally, the title insurer is subject to criminal and civil
penalties for violations of the order. 251
Although the GTOs have increased FinCEN’s access to beneficial
ownership information, they have not necessarily increased public
244 A 2015 investigation by the New York Times estimated that more than half of the $8
billion in annual residential real estate transactions exceeding $5 million per sale involved
use of a shell company. Louise Story & Stephanie Saul, Stream of Foreign Wealth Flows to Elite
New York Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08
/nyregion/stream-of-foreign-wealth-flows-to-time-warner-condos.html?_r=0
[https://
perma.cc/NN7A-GBBQ].
245 See Five Geographic Targeting Orders Best Practices, THOMSON REUTERS, https://
legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/geographic-targeting-orders-bestpractices [https://perma.cc/R8FJ-FP2J].
246 Id.
247 FinCEN Takes Aim at Real Estate Secrecy in Manhattan and Miami, FINCEN (Jan. 13,
2016), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/news_release/20160113.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ABL7-PJLY].
248 On May 8, 2020, FinCEN issued an order covering the following areas: Bexar,
Tarrant, and Dallas counties in Texas; Miami-Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties in
Florida; all five boroughs of New York City; San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, San
Mateo, and Santa Clara counties in California; the city and county of Honolulu; Clark
County in Nevada; King County in Washington; Suffolk and Middlesex counties in
Massachusetts; and Cook County in Illinois. See FINCEN, GEOGRAPHIC TARGETING ORDER,
at 1–2 (May 8, 2020) https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Generic%20Real
%20Estate%20GTO%20Order%20FINAL%20508_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/M24Z-SJWG].
249 Id. at 2, 4.
250 Id. at 5.
251 Id. at 5.
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access. The Bank Secrecy Act exempts reports filed with FinCEN from
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. 252 The governing
statutes and regulations, however, do not explicitly preclude the
covered business entity—the title insurance company—from
disclosing information it collects about beneficial ownership. Whether
that information would have value to marketers or others is an open
question. Unlike banks and brokerage firms who have a continuing
relationship with customers and who have a continuing obligation to
keep beneficial ownership records current, 253 title insurers usually have
a one-shot relationship with customers and they have no obligation to
update beneficial ownership information.
Because beneficial
ownership of entities can change quickly, the information maintained
by title insurers may become too stale to be of value to marketers.
The Corporate Transparency Act of 2020 (CTA), 254 enacted in
December 2020 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act,
imposes more stringent beneficial ownership reporting requirements
for anonymous shell entities. 255 The CTA targets shell companies with
few actual business operations, entities referred to by the statute as
“reporting compan[ies].” 256 The CTA requires each “reporting
company” to submit annually to FinCEN the name, date of birth, and
address of each beneficial owner, as well as an identifying number from
an “acceptable identification document” such as a passport or driver’s
license. 257 Any person who exercises substantial control over the entity,
or who owns or controls “not less than 25 percent of the ownership
interests of the entity” qualifies as a beneficial owner. 258 Like the Bank
Secrecy Act, the CTA treats information disclosed to FinCEN as
confidential, with disclosure permitted only for law enforcement
purposes. 259
Proponents of the CTA lauded its enactment, 260 but the statute
relies on potential wrongdoers to comply voluntarily with the new
252 31 U.S.C. § 5319. Indeed, FinCEN relied on the statute in denying a request by the
authors for reports filed pursuant to the initial GTO. See letter on file with authors.
253 31 C.F.R. § 1020.210(b)(5) (Banks); 31 C.F.R. § 1023.210(b)(5) (securities brokers
and dealers).
254 31 U.S.C. § 5336.
255 See William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6402, 134 Stat. 3388, 4604–05.
256 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11) (defining “reporting company”).
257 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(1) (defining “acceptable identification document”); 31 U.S.C.
§ 5336(b)(2)(A) (including the reporting requirements).
258 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(3) (defining “beneficial owner”).
259 31 U.S.C. § 5336(c).
260 See Jeanne Whelan, Congress Bans Anonymous Shell Companies After Long Campaign by
Anti-Corruption Groups, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/uspolicy/2020/12/11/anonymous-shell-company-us-ban/ [https://perma.cc/4Q2Z-SGZD].

WEISBORD_STERK_03_23.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

558

3/23/2022 3:48 PM

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:2

reporting requirements. The CTA’s disclosure mandate applies to
every “reporting company,” which it defines as any “corporation,
limited liability company, or other similar entity” that satisfies the
formal requirements for entity formation. 261 But that definition also
contains more than twenty specific exclusions, including publicly
traded companies, 262 banks, 263 and companies with twenty or more
employees and $5 million in annual gross receipts. 264 Thus, unlike
prior legislation and the GTOs, which commandeered reputable
financial institutions such as banks and title insurance companies to
aid in reporting beneficial ownership information to the government,
the CTA is directed largely at the reporting entities themselves. In fact,
Congress directed the Secretary of the Treasury to revise its existing
due diligence requirements for financial institutions to reduce
burdens that might, in light of the statute, be “unnecessary or
duplicative.” 265 In the end, the statute’s effectiveness may be undercut
by the absence of significant enforcement mechanisms. Although
reporting violations carry civil penalties, a maximum fine of $10,000,
and up to two years of imprisonment, 266 those penalties are directed at
money launderers who, by definition, are already willing lawbreakers
because the crime of money laundering involves the concealment of
assets derived from the violation of some other law. 267
3. The Impact of Money Laundering Regulations on Entity
Ownership
If purchasers acquire real estate in entity form largely for
investment or tax reasons, or to protect their privacy interests, neither
the GTOs nor the Corporate Transparency Act would have much effect
on patterns of property ownership. Disclosure to FinCEN would not
change the investment or tax advantages of entity ownership, and, so
long as FinCEN must keep the reports confidential, disclosure to
FinCEN would not reduce the privacy incentives for entity ownership.
A recent empirical study of the GTOs, however, painted a very
different picture. Purchases by corporate entities nationwide fell
significantly after the first announcement of the FinCEN policy, while

261 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11) (defining “reporting company”).
262 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(i).
263 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(iii).
264 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxi).
265 William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021, supra note 255 § 6403(d), 134 Stat. 4624.
266 31 U.S.C. § 5336(h)(3).
267 See 31 U.S.C. § 5340 (defining money laundering as “the movement of illicit cash
or cash equivalent proceeds”).
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there was no similar drop-off in total purchase volume. 268 Before
FinCEN’s announcement of the policy, all-cash corporate acquisitions
represented 10% of the dollar volume of nationwide purchases; after
the announcement, that percentage plummeted to 2.5%. 269 High-end
housing prices—those most affected by the GTOs—dropped by 4.2%
on an annual basis in counties subject to the GTOs compared to
counties not covered by the orders. 270 These numbers strongly suggest
that the demand associated with shell entity buyers was driven in
considerable measure by a desire for anonymity from the authorities.271
The empirical evidence suggests that disclosure of beneficial
ownership of entity purchasers may be an effective weapon against the
use of real estate to launder money, but that evidence is not conclusive.
For one, the GTOs appear to have provoked a modest increase in entity
purchases without title insurance. 272 Because title insurers are the
entities charged with identifying and reporting beneficial ownership,
purchases without title insurance do not trigger disclosure to the
government. Perhaps that increase can be explained by the purchase
of entity-owned real estate by money launderers who are willing to
forego title insurance and rely on other means of ascertaining the
quality of title. Another option still available to money launderers
would be to take title in the name of a third-party trustee, since trusts
appear to fall outside the definition of “legal entities” covered by the
GTOs. 273 Preliminary data, however, suggests little or no increase in
the use of trusts after implementation of the GTOs. 274
Finally, although FinCEN’s GTOs significantly reduced real estate
purchases in the name of a covered entity, it did not stop entity
purchasers in their tracks as one would expect if money laundering
were the only reason for purchasing in entity form. Consistent with
that finding, our own investigation of high-end Manhattan
condominium purchases revealed a significant number of purchases
in corporate form in the years following implementation of the GTO

268 Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 239, at 18.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 5. See also id. at 20.
271 Id. at 6.
272 Id. at 21–22. It is not clear whether the increase in purchases without title insurance
is statistically significant. Id.
273 See FINCEN, supra note 248, at 4 (defining a covered legal entity as “a corporation,
limited liability company, partnership or other similar business entity, whether formed
under the laws of a state, or of the United States, or a foreign jurisdiction, other than a
business whose common stock or analogous equity interests are listed on a securities
exchange regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) or a self-regulatory
organization registered with the SEC, or an entity solely owned by such a business.”).
274 Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 239, at 22.
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covering Manhattan. 275 Many high-end buyers were apparently unconcerned about disclosure of their identities to the federal government,
but nevertheless used the corporate form for less nefarious reasons—
either to obtain investment or tax benefits, or to protect their identities
from web harvesters and the public at large. For these buyers, the
Corporate Transparency Act is unlikely to deter use of entity
ownership, but unlike the GTOs, the Act imposes the beneficial
ownership reporting obligation directly on the buyers rather than on
financial institutions and intermediaries.
4. Summary
Title to most residential real property is still recorded in the name
of readily identifiable individuals, but a confluence of factors has led
to increased anonymity in the public land records. Expanded restrictions on anonymous ownership may be a useful weapon in the
fight against money laundering, and deputizing title insurers or other
private parties as information collection agents may be the most
efficient way to combat anonymity. But a broad-based requirement
that beneficial ownership be reported to private parties could limit the
value of entity ownership as a data privacy safeguard. For individuals
concerned about the commodification of public land records, the use
of anonymous entity ownership for the legitimate purpose of avoiding
public recordation of the purchaser’s PII is not foreclosed by FinCEN’s
GTOs or by the Corporate Transparency Act. However, all-cash buyers
who purchase in the name of an entity should be advised that their
transactions are not entirely anonymous, at least with respect to the
government, and, at least, for now.
CONCLUSION
The online disclosure of public land records by local deed
recorders pits the traditional notification functions of the deed
recording system at odds with the privacy interests of homeowners.
Before land records were computerized and published on the internet,
the competing needs for disclosure and the relative privacy of PII, such
as one’s home address and marital status, existed in a de facto state of
equilibrium. Access to public land records was difficult enough to
deter widespread publication of the homeowner’s information but
simple enough to obtain by transactional parties with a legitimate need
for the information. Recently, however, in response to growing
demand for electronic filing and recordkeeping, many local deed
recorders digitized their records with the help of private vendors and
275
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now sell public land records online for a fee. Web-based access to
those records, in turn, led to the commodification of data extracted
from deeds for purposes unrelated to the recording system’s noticegiving function. To feed the booming demand for big data, commercial data brokers deploy sophisticated bots to harvest homeowners’
personal information, which is then sold and disseminated widely on
the internet. Lawmakers in Congress and state legislatures have
proposed measures to protect the privacy of PII for judges and other
at-risk governmental officials, but they have yet to confront the big
question of how to address the privacy of ordinary homeowners when
public land records are now commodified and sold commercially by
default. Prospective homebuyers seeking to prevent the online
publication of personally identifiable deed content must now record
title in the name of an anonymous corporate entity or trust, but
government efforts to combat money laundering may limit the
availability of those options in some areas. Existing homeowners
concerned about data privacy face an even more dismal choice: they
must either relocate from their current personal residence or tolerate
the online sale and dissemination of their deed information.
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